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Abstract
The topic of this paper in a broad phrase is “proof theory”. It tries to theorize the general
notion of “proving” something using rigorous definitions, inspired by previous less general
theories. The purpose for being this general is to eventually establish a rigorous framework
that can bridge the gap when interrelating different logical systems, particularly ones
that have not been as well defined rigorously, such as sequent calculus. Even as far as
semantics go on more formally defined logic such as classic propositional logic, concepts
like “completeness” and “soundness” between the “semantic” and the “deductive system”
is too arbitrarily defined on the specific system that is applied to for it to carry as an
adequate definition. What we shall do then is come up with an adequate definition for
a characterization of every logic that one has worked with, and show what can be done
with it for a few basic logical systems that include classic propositional logic, intuitionistic
propositional logic and intuitionistic sequent calculus. To make this definition work with
eloquence, we go the category theory route of constructing a category with objects that
correspond to collections of logical formulae and arrows that correspond to deductions
from one such collection to another.
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1
Introduction
So the main question at hand is what exactly does this paper seek out to do. While a
very necessary question, it is not a very easy one to anwer since proof theory in general is
somewhat of an obscure discipline with motivations that, although existant, do not come
to mind immediately. In this case, what I am doing has not really been mathematically
constructed, so much as given a mathematical definition. I shall nevertheless do what I
can to explain what it is that is being done and why it is being done this way
I shall start with the easy part first, which is why. Proof theory–to the extent that there
is first order logic, classical logic, intuitionistic logic, sequent calculus, and linear logic–
has not been rigorously defined in a way that is adequate for discussing all these logics
together in unison. While one can talk about these structures in an intuitive way that
captures the right idea when analyzing the logic as its own structure, there is a lot that
gets lost from the lack of formality when it comes to comparing two deductive systems.
An example of comparing two deductive systems that is very popular in logic, since the
discipline came to be, is showing that we can derive aspects (or all) of one system from
another.
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For example, we have a notion of “soundness” and “completeness” between the deduc-
tive system of classical logic and the semantic system of classical logic, but that notion
does not really extend generally once we get to things like sequent calculus. What also does
not extend generally very well is what an “inference rule” exactly is or a “logical axiom”.
We have a horizontal bar style of deduction/inference, but comparing two different logical
systems again becomes problematic because the definitions have not been unified between
these sorts of things.
What this paper proposes to fix this is to define things like language, inference rules,
deductions, soundness and completion, and finally logic, very generally using category the-
ory, which gives us the tools to do this very effectively. After defining all these things, it is
shown how they apply to very familiar systems of logic. Various propositional varieties of
logic, which include classical propositional, intuitionistic propositional, and intuitionistic
sequent calculus, get a chapter’s worth of attention each, but various widely known pred-
icate logics get attention, too, in my variety of examples. The exact organization of how
I do this is as follows:
Chapter 2 covers the preliminary information that one needs to know which includes
a theoretical treatment of structural induction, an informal presentation of horizontal bar
style deductions and sequent calculus, category theory, and a little bit of graph theory. It
is expected that the reader has a fairly comprehensive background in mathmatical logic
and category theory in particular, but this chapter does provide the necessary background
information in these subjects should the reader need it. Moreover, Chapter 2 is very crucial
in deriving a very important, yet infrequently oberved concept in category theory known
as the “free category”. While a category under the name of “free category” is discussed
in MacLane, this turns out to be only the special case of a general sort of category that
happens to be majorly useful in this paper.
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Chapter 3 lays down the definitions, much of which have been shown to exist by virtue of
the free category that was derived in Chapter 2. In the first section, we define languages.
Afterwards, the construction of a category called the“deductive category”–intended to
standardize all logical deductive systems–shall take place. First the objects will be con-
structed in one section, and the arrows shortly afterwards. A crucial section lays down
the general concept of “soundness” (and analogously “completeness”) between two logics,
which will allow us to assess the ability for one deductive system to “imply” another. Other
sections make a few general applications to the deductive category to more general verions
of useful logical constructs such as valuation mappings and hypothesis construction.
Chapter 4 applies this categorical treatment of logic to the most simple of the con-
ventional logic: Classical propositional logic. Here, the language and inference rules are
defined in the most minimal, yet eloquent, way possible. From this, the familiar properties
of propositional logic are derived and it is then shown to be sound and complete with the
very familiar truth table treatment of classical propositional logic.
Chapter 5 covers the final application of this categorical treatment to definitely the
most complicated deductive logic that this paper derives in rigorous detail. And that is
intuitionistic sequent calculus. As a language that uses a construct as exotic as sequents
with a very bizarre method of doing inferences with propositions, it is necessary to define a
whole new language that is different from any that one is familar with. This new language
in general is called the “metalanguage” since the idea of categorical logic here is to make
inferences on objects in a language and sequent calculus makes these inferences on a class
of objects that correspond to the metalanguage of propositions. It then only makes sense
to mathematically construct a language that corresponds to a “metalanguage” of a base
language and observe derivability with respect to that language.
Once this metalanguage has been created, the attention of Chapter 5 will then focus to
the construction of intuitionistic sequent calculus. Again the minimal amount of inference
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rules and symbols needed to create this logic will be used, meaning a lot of Chapter 6 will
be setting up a theoretical framework that will effectively derive these other rules. The
main rule at hand is called the “cut rule”, or “cut elimination”, which turns out to take
a proof so long and technical that the process (particularly the proof itself) gets its own
section. Once all the desired rules of intuitionistic sequent calculus are established, the
next sections derive some properties of major note, which include its untimate relationship
with propositional logic as it is conventionally done.
Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude this paper, and lay the road map as to where to go
with this theory next. Most vitally this will include deriving linear logic, as this turns out
to be a major motivation for creating this categorical system. An informal discussion of
linear logic is then in order. But other future topics will be discussed such as the possibility
of generalizing this logic to infinite vectors (functions) of propositions, defining a general
notion of “satisfiability” and “consistency”, and finally a little bit on how one can apply
this system to more complicated predicate systems.
2
Preliminaries
This chapter explores some preliminary mathematical concepts that are both obscure
and required to understand in order to proceed with the theoretical conquest of this paper.
Section 2.1 deals with the bread and butter to much of our constructions and proofs of
their qualities: Definition by Recursion and Structural Induction. Section 2.2 presents
an informal presentation of Natural Deduction, which will be a style of proof that this
text will adapt. Section 2.3 is a crash course on Category Theory, which is mostly there
to establish the terminology and notation that shall be used throughout. Section 2.4 is
devoted to deriving the “free category”–a very useful tool in category theory that will allow
us to establish a robust definition for logical deductions. Finally, Section 2.5 is provides
preliminary information on graph theory and then uses graph theory and the free category
to derive some very necessary tools.
2.1 Definition by Recursion and Structural Induction
Induction is useful. If there is anywhere that one will see this fact, it will be in this paper.
Knowledge shall be assumed of Peanno’s Axioms and the many variants of mathematical
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induction (such as strong induction). But induction is used to the point where it can
definitely get obscure, hence clear the obscurity up with this section. Note that it will be
assumed that the reader has been exposed to the Peanno Axioms, but for anyone in need
of reference can find a treatment, here. [1]
First, acknowledgement shall be made about Definition by Recursion. It appears so
much in mathematics that one often forgets that it happens, until one runs into a strange
implementation of Definition by Recursion and thinks to oneself, “But you can’t do that!”
It’s very intuitive why, but theoretically it is not straightforward why it is that given a
function k : E Ñ E one can conjure up a unique function f : N Ñ E such that fs  kf ,
where s : N Ñ N is the successor function. Here is the theorem.
Theorem 2.1.1. (Definition By Recursion) Let E be a set. Given a function k : E Ñ E
and e P E, there exists a unique function f : N Ñ E such that
fpnq 
#
e, if n  1
kpfpn 1qq, if n ¡ 1.
The proof to this theorem can be found in Theorem 2.5.5 of Bloch’s Real Analysis text.
[1]
To understand structural induction, what should be first cleared up is what exactly is
“structural induction”? It’s when there is a mathematical structure that is “inductive” in
the sense that there is a “basic” or “atomic” component and then a “recursive” component,
where one form new objects by taking objects in the element (these objects playing the
role of “recursion”) and then forming new objects. How this differs from original induction
is that now the structure itself does not correspond in any way to the natural numbers, or
any peanno object for that matter. Oftentimes the structure doesn’t even share the same
cardinality. For example, a vector space, which has a basis, is an example of a structurally
inductive set since every element can be formed by operations that bring about recursion
that stems from a basis.
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What does, however, make the structure inductive is the recursion. The structure starts
with “basic” component which one can call the “order one” instance of our structure, since
one cannot generate the occurence of a given “basic” object from other objects (in the
same way that in Peanno’s Axioms one cannot get the number 1 from any input of our
successor function). Then the structure has “recursive component” where an object is
labeled “order n” based on how many acts of recursion were done from the base case to
get the new object.
Rigorously, a set which is structurally inductive can be thought as a set E along with
a set C of functions f : Enf Ñ E such that there is a base case set A such that for every
G  E, if A  G and G is closed under the function class C, then G  E. If one thinks
about it, this is really the generalized Peanno Axioms because the Peanno Axioms can
be viewed this way two with t1u as the base case set and then the function class as tsu,
where s is again a successor function
This theorem establishes how easily constructible this sort of set is. Given any set and
any set of function classes on that set, we can form a subset that is structurally inductive.
This sort of thing is exactly what we shall need for our theoretical constructions starting
in the next chapter.
Theorem 2.1.2. Let W be a set. Let C be a collection of functions f : Wmf Ñ W , for
some mf ¥ 1. Let A be a set disjoint from fpW
mf q, for each f P C and the corresponding
mf ¥ 1. Then there exists some E  W such that A  G  E and fpe1, . . . , emf q P G,
for any f P C and e1, . . . , emf P G, imply G  E.
Proof. Define Gn recursively for n ¥ 1 as follows
En 
#
A, if n  1,
fPC fpE
mf
n1q, otherwise.
We shall prove that E 

n¥1En is a set with the desired properties. Note first that
A  E. Let G be a set such that A  G  E and fpe1, . . . , emf q P G, for any f P C and
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e1, . . . , emf P G. We need to prove E  G. Let p P E. Then p P En, for some n ¥ 1. We
shall prove that p P G by induction on n. For n  1, we have p P A  G. For our inductive
step, if p1 P G, for all p1 P En, we find p P fpE
mf
n q, for some f P C; so it follows by inductive
hypothesis that p  fpe1, . . . , emf q, for e1, . . . , emf P G, hence p P G by hypothesis.
2.2 Natural Deduction Informally Presented
In logic, a mathematical process called “natural deduction”, or more generally “hori-
zontal bar style proofs”, is a nice thing. It’s nice because oftentimes deriving new formulas
in a logical scheme is a very technical, step-heavy process that could use an eloquent
shorthand method of laying out, as opposed to simply writing all the steps by paragraphs
and words. However, eloquence comes at the price of obscurity. These horizontal bar con-
ventions are rather notation heavy; therefore, they are unclear, and morover do not have
much of a rigorous definition behind them. Chapter 3 will try to resolve the latter problem
and provide a rigorous definition, but rigorous definitions do not always provide provide
clarity. This section shall try to provide clarity and alleviate such confusion.
Natural deduction is a system that is typically used in propositional/predicate logic
with the usual ^,_, ,Ñ,Ø,K,J connectives and @, D quantifiers. What the horizontal
bar style does is try to incorporate various inference rules that one has in a given system
in the style of an input-output formula. On the top is one or more input formulas, and
on the bottom is an output formula; in other words, a single bar plays the role of taking
one formula and “infering” a new formula. To the right side of these horizontal bars is the
type of inference rule that it is, which is essentially the label for an overall formula. What
will be helpful at this time is some examples, so here are a few familiar ones
φ
_I1,
φ_ ϕ
ϕ
_I2,
φ_ ϕ
φ φÑ ϕ
Ñ E,
ϕ
φ ϕ
^I,
φ^ ϕ
φ^ ϕ
^E1,
φ
φ^ ϕ
^E2,
ϕ
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As one can see, these inference rules provide an algorithm to be able to make a multistep
process that would make up a lot of tedious writing into a proof in a few lines. For example,
proving φ^ ϕ derives pθ _ φq _ ϕ, one writes
φ^ ϕ
^E1
φ
_I2
θ _ φ
_I1.
pθ _ φq _ ϕ
So far this is pretty accessible for the most part (assuming somewhat of a background
in symbolic logic), but there is one more roadblock to understand that is not very clear
at first, and the lack of a great “rigorous” definition does not help, and this the use of
hypotheses. A very motivating way of understanding the Ñ connective is really concieving
it as implication in the colloquial sense of “pÑ q means assuming p, we deduce q.” So to
provide an inference rule for Ñ, this is where hypotheses notation comes in with making
a hypothesis p and deducing things from such hypothesis to show we can indeed deduce
q, which allows us to infer p Ñ q. Any hypothesis formula in natural deduction one
places a box rφs around it to indicate that it is a hypothesis. From this, inference rules
can be formed using hypotheses and conclusions, with vertical dots indicating steps of
inference in between the hypotheses and the conclusion. Here are two such inference rules
in propositional logic
φ_ ϕ
rφs



θ
rϕs



θ
_E,
θ
rφs



ϕ
Ñ I.
φÑ ϕ
For example, to prove that one go from no formula at all to derive φÑ φ_ ϕ, the proof
is presented as
rφs
_1
φ_ ϕ
Ñ I.
φÑ pφ_ ϕq
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One confusing thing, however, to deal with is when there is more than one hypothesis
happening at once. What is the protocol, there? Well now natural deduction starts to
become a story of “charging” and “discharging” hypotheses. In other words, one can
“charge” a hypothesis statement anytime in the deduction and inference rules such as
_E and Ñ I play the roll of “discharging” hypotheses after they have been made. A
legitimate deduction has all its hypotheses that were made at any point of the deduction
discharged. To eliminate ambiguity, the boxes and discharging inference rule uses have
upper script numbers that correspond to which inference rule cancels what. For example,
in the deduction from no formula to derive ppφ^ ϕq Ñ θq Ñ pφÑ pϕÑ θqq, one writes
rφs2 rϕs1
^I
φ^ ϕ rpφ^ ϕq Ñ θs3
Ñ E
θ
Ñ I1
ϕÑ θ
Ñ I2
φÑ pϕÑ θq
Ñ I3.
ppφ^ ϕq Ñ θq Ñ pφÑ pϕÑ θqq
For further inquiries, it is recommended to explore Van Dalen’s introductory logic text.
[3]
2.3 Preliminary Category Theory
This section shalll introduce some Category theory. For any outside source inquirey,
Mac Lane’s text is strongly recommended. [7] Here is the basic definition of a category.
Definition 2.3.1. A Category C is class of objects ObpCq and a class of arrows ArpCq
with the following properties.
1. Composition. For every arrow A
f
ÞÑ B and B
g
ÞÑ A, there exists some arrow A
gf
ÞÑ C.
2. Associativity. For every arrow f, g, h, it holds that pfgqh  fpghq.
3. Identity. For every object A, there exists some arrow A
1AÞÑ A such that f1A  f and
1Ag  g, for every arrow A
f
ÞÑ B and C
g
ÞÑ A.
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For an arrow A
f
ÞÑ B, a right inverse is an arrow B
f 1
ÞÑ A such that ff 1  1B. For an
arrow A
f
ÞÑ B, a left inverse is an arrow B
f 1
ÞÑ A such that f 1f  1A. For an arrow
A
f
ÞÑ B, an inverse is an arrow B
f 1
ÞÑ A that is both a right inverse and a left inverse. 4
Remark 2.3.2. With regards to notation, it is standard in category theory to denote a
category C as both a set of objects and a set of arrows. In other words, when one says
A P ObpCq, it is pretty standard to write A is in C, and same for f P ArpCq. So if no
ambiguity arises, be alert to see C used interchangably with instances where the object
class is being referenced or those where the arrow class is being referenced. ♦
Here are a few good examples of commonly-used categories.
Example 2.3.3. The first (and most intuitive) category is the category Set of all sets.
The object class is all sets and the arrow class is all functions between those sets.
There are similar “set with structure” categories. One is Grp with the object class of
all groups and arrow class of all homomorphisms between those groups. Another is Top
with the object class of all topological spaces and arrow class of all continuous functions
between those spaces. Yet another analogous example, which for the purposes of this paper
will be very useful, is the category Grph with the object class of all graphs and arrow
class the class of all homomorphisms between those graphs. Note that the last section of
this chapter will expand on particularly the graph category. ♦
Example 2.3.4. A couple of other categories set don’t involve functional arrows include
the following:
One is the category generated by a group pG, q. The object class is actually the singular set
itself and the arrows are the elements in the group, which can be thought of as having the
same domain and codomain. Notice that this is a category since group elements g, f P G
are by definition closed under its operation , hence g  f forms a compsition arrow. It is
furthermore easy to verify that e suffices for the identity arrow.
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Another category is one formed by a poset pP,¤q. We can think of the relation a ¤ b as
an arrow between the elements a, b P P . The property of transitivity gives us composition
since given a ¤ b and b ¤ c we can always form a ¤ c. Since arrows in the poset between
domains are unique by construction, we find the relexive property a ¤ a gives us an
identity arrow for each element. ♦
Example 2.3.5. Now some categories formulated from other categories shall be defined.
Given a category C, the dual category Cop (sometimes called the “opposite category”) has
the object class the same as C and the arrow class is formulated as follows: For every
arrow A
f
ÞÑ B in C, there exists an arrow B fopÞÑ A in Cop. It is easy to verifty that Cop is a
category.
Given two categories C1 and C2, a product category C1  C2 has the object class
ObpC1q ObpC2q and the arrow class ArpC1q ArpC2q. Composition forms from the oper-
ation pg1, g2qpf1, f2q : pg1f1, g2f2q and the identity is p1A1 , 1A2q for any object pA1, A2q.
This can be easily generalized to a family of categories tCαuαPJ for an arbitrary index J
to form the product category
±
αPJ Cα with the object class
±
αPJ ObpCαq ad the arrow
class
±
αPJ ArpCαq.
Given two categories C1 and C2, one can also form a coproduct category C1   C2. The
object class is the union pObpC1q  t1uq Y pObpC2q  t2uq and the arrow class is the union
pArpC1qt1uqY pArpC2qt2uq. Here, it holds that the categorical structure of the arrows
are preserved, and there are no arrows that map any object in ObpC1q  t1u to any object
in ObpC2q  t2u, since the object and arrow classes are disjoint by obvious design.
Like product categories, this can be generalized to a family of categories tCαuαPJ for
an arbitrary index J to form the product category
²
αPJ Cα with the object class
αPJpObpCαq  tαuq and the arrow class

αPJpArpCαq  tαuq. ♦
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Remark 2.3.6. One should take special notice to how the co-product category was
formed. Not only will this category prove useful in proving a major result very soon,
but the way it was constructed brings note to a little known, yet useful process called
the “disjoint union”. This is a procedure that is typically done when one wants to either
include the same element more than once or to include something “different” but for some
reason is mathematically convenient to denote it under the same name. ♦
Next this section defines the thing that in some ways is more important than the category
itself when it comes to how it gets utilized. This of course is the functor, which essentially
maps one category to another. The thing to understand is that it is essentially a two piece
function that maps objects to objects and then arrows to arrows, in a way that preserves
the structure of how the arrows are arranged. In other words, if there is an arrow A
f
ÞÑ B,
the functor F makes sure that some arrow F pAq
F pfq
ÞÑ F pBq exists, and hence our domain
and codomain get preserved in the mapping of F . The definition is as follows.
Definition 2.3.7. A Functor F : C Ñ D is a mapping from the category C to the category
D. More specifically a functor is a bi-product of two functions FOb : ObpCq Ñ ObpDq and
FAr : ArpCq Ñ ArpDq such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Arrow domain and codomain structure is preserved under F . Hence, every arrow A
f
ÞÑ B
in C gets mapped to the arrow FObpAq FArpfqÞÑ FObpBq in D.
2. FArp1Aq  1FObpAq, for every object A in C
3. FArpgfq  FArpgq  FArpfq, for every arrow A
f
ÞÑ B and B
g
ÞÑ C in C.
A category C is called isomorphic with D if there exists a functor F : C Ñ D such that
there exists an inverse functor F1. 4
Remark 2.3.8. A few additional things to note about functors. First is that although
it is “clear notation” to differentiate the object component of the functor from the arrow
component, the functor is really one function that maps arrows to arrows. This is because
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the composition properties imply that the objects, which are the domain and codomain of
each arrow, are consistently mapped to a single object that is the domain and codomain
of the single mapped arrow.
Functors, as functions, also have the property that a given functor F : C Ñ D is injective
if and only if F has a left inverse and F is surjective if and only if F has a right inverse
(as a function typically does). Moreover, it is easy to verify that the image of a functor
F pDq is a category.
Finally, one should note the general limitations of isomorphism functors as a way of denot-
ing “categorical equivilance”. This is because the the identity functor is only one functor
object that is equivilent up to so-called “natural isomorphism”, which arises in the “cat-
egory of functors”, and captures more generally what it means to think of a category as
“essentially the same”. ♦
In category theory, there is a distinction one needs to make between “small” and “large”
categories. Now that functors have been defined it is a good place to now make this
distinction.
Definition 2.3.9. Basically, a small category is a category whose object class can be
expressed as a set in ZFC set theory. A large category, on the other hand, is a category
that is not small. In other words, the object class cannot be expressed as a set in ZFC
set theory (such as the “universal set”). Furthermore, any functor whose domain and
codomain is a small category will be called a small functor, and any functor whose
domain or codomain is large will analogously be called a large functor. 4
Remark 2.3.10. Unfortunately, for the rigor-bent reader, this is not a rigorous definition
since the involved axiomatic set theory brings much more technicality than it does insight
to the theory this paper deals with. The curious reader looking for a more rigorous treat-
ment should consult Bloch’s introductory proofs text for the ZFC axioms, [2] MacLane for
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much more standard treatment of large categories. [7] The reader may also appreciate for
a starting explanation of the NBG axioms used to rigorously define the “proper classes”
for which make up the object classes of large categories. [9] ♦
Example 2.3.11. It is now a good time to define a the category Cat of all small categories.
The object class is the class of small categories and the arrow class is the class of all small
functors between those small classes. ♦
Next in the list of vital definitions is the notion of products and coproducts. A product
as an object with projections to a family of objects is no new one. The co-product is a
family of objects that all commonly project to the coproduct. Interestingly, a co-product
in C is the product in Cop., and vice versa. Provided is first a definition of the specific case
of product and coproduct where the family has specifically two elements (as this is the
easier one to digest on first glance). Then the more general case is defined, which for this
paper’s purposes has its much needed utility.
Definition 2.3.12. Given two objects A and B in a category C, a cartesian bi-product
AB of A and B in a category C is an object with the following properties.
1. There exists two projection arrows AB
piAÞÑ A and AB
piBÞÑ B.
2. Given a collection of arrows Y
fAÞÑ A and Y
fBÞÑ B, there exists a unique arrow Y
f
ÞÑ AB
such that fpiA  fA and fpiB  fB.
A cartesian co-bi-product A  B of A and B in C is an object with the following two
properties.
1. There exists two projection arrows A
µAÞÑ A B and B
µAÞÑ A B.
2. Given a collection of arrows A
fAÞÑ Y and B
fBÞÑ Y , there exists a unique arrow A B
f
ÞÑ Y
such that µAf  fA and µBf  fB. 4
Definition 2.3.13. Given a family of objects Xi in a category C under an index set I, a
cartesian product
±
iPI Xi is an object with the following properties.
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1. For every k P I, there exists a projection arrow
±
iPI Xi
pikÞÑ Xk.
2. Given a collection of arrows Y
fkÞÑ Xk, for each k P I, there exists a unique arrow
Y
f
ÞÑ
±
iPI Xk such that fpik  fk, for each k P I.
A cartesian co-product
²
iPI Xi in C is an object with the following two properties.
1. For every k P I, there exists a projection arrow Xk
µiÞÑ
²
iPI Xi.
2. Given a collection of arrows Xk
fkÞÑ Y , there exists a unique arrow
²
iPI Xi
f
ÞÑ Y such
that µkf  fk, for each k P I. 4
Now is the point to discuss what is very central to this paper’s application of category
theory, and that is so-called “diagrams”.
Definition 2.3.14. A diagram on a category C is a functor F : J Ñ C, where J is some
category (that one might call the “index category”).
A small diagram is a diagram F : J Ñ C whose index category (but not necessarily the
codomain category C) J is small. Any diagram whose index category is not small shall be
called a large diagram. 4
Note that it does not matter what exactly the given “index category” is–in a similar way
to an arbitrary index set–so much as it is does its job of taking a collection of objects, and
describing its categorical structure of objects and arrows (in the category). In a similar
way that an index set is used to index a family of elements in a set, an index category is
used to index the objects in the category as well as the arrows between them.
Now here is one more definition before moving on to two more sections of applications.
First is a cone, which is an intuitive geometric description of what is going on because
a cone has a single point with a lot of points (in many cases uncountably many!) that
connect to that point, which is more or less what is going on here. A limit on a diagram we
can describe as essentially the “smallest cone” that exists–the measurement of size being
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the existance of a unique arrow from single point in one cone to a single point in another
cone, such that the structure of the other cone commutes with that arrow.
Definition 2.3.15. In a category C, a cone pN,ψq in a diagram F : J Ñ C is an object
N with a family of arrows N
ψXÞÑ X such that for any arrow X
f
ÞÑ Y in J , we have
F pfqψX  ψY .
A cone pL,ϕq in the diagram F is a limit if given any cone pN,ψq, there exists a unique
arrow N
u
ÞÑ L such that for any arrow X
f
ÞÑ Y in J , we find the arrows L
ϕXÞÑ X and
L
ϕYÞÑ Y and arrows N
ψXÞÑ X and N
ψYÞÑ Y that exist by definition of a cone are such that
uϕX  ψX and uϕY  ψY . 4
Remark 2.3.16. It is pretty easy to verify that a limit pL,ϕq in a given diagram is unique
up to object isomorphism. This fact will be very useful in this paper. ♦
2.4 The Free Category
This section derives a concept that is very valuable, and that is the notion of a “free
category”. Now the “free category” has definitely been mentioned before in standard
category theory texts. However, they are not entirely the holy grail “free category” that
this paper seek, and neither are they really a “less general version”, although in some
respects it can be thought that way. Although that is not to say that this other “free
category” is not useful as it definitely is, and is co-integrated heavily with the new free
category
What the free category is intuitively is a category that one can generate “for free”
from a diagram that essentially constructs a category with desirable properties. For ex-
ample, one may want to make into products, or even co-products, while still preserving its
original arrows, without adding arrows that are unneeded, or worse doesn’t have desirable
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properties. Can it be done? With the free category, we can. However, its existence is not
so straightforward. And that is why it is proven here.
First some additional vocabulary must be presented, which is the notion of categorical
completeness.
Definition 2.4.1. A category C is small-complete if every small diagram F : J Ñ C has
a limit. 4
While this definition seems rather arbitrary, it is more powerful than it appears. The power
shall be demonstrated this after showing that Cat is a category that meets the “small
complete” criterion. It does so with major ease, actually, since after all it is the category of
ALL (small) categories, with just about every category possible, including categories that
make up the limit of any diagram. Ok, he proof is not that simple, but it’s surprisingly
not that complicated. It requires a bit of an understanding of how to commute arrows,
particularly with co-products. The theorem shall now be presented.
Theorem 2.4.2. Cat is small-complete.
Proof. Let F : J Ñ Cat be a small diagram. Let V be the set of cones on F . Let
L 
²
pN,ψqPV N be the coproduct category of categories N indexed by the cone pN,ψq
on F . Let uN : N Ñ L be the co-projection. For each X in J , let ψNX : N Ñ F pXq be
the component functors in each cone pN,ψq on F . It follows that there exists a unique
mapping φX such that uNφX  ψNX , for every cone pN,ψq.
We shall first prove that pL, φq is a cone on F , and in doing so prove that pL, φq is a limit.
Given a cone pN,ψq, we find uN as the co-projection arrow is unique. Furthermore, we
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find that given the arrow F pXq
F pfq
ÞÑ F pY q in Cat, we have ψX and ψY such that
ψXF pfq  ψY
uNφXF pfq  uNφY
φXF pfq  φY .
Now the free category in its most general sense can be defined.
Definition 2.4.3. Given a small diagram F : J Ñ Cat, the the limit category C1 of F ,
which exists by Theorem 2.4.2, we shall call the Free Category generated by the small
diagram F . 4
2.5 The Path Category and the Cartesian Path Category
This paper is one that definitely incorporates a lot of category theory. But in doing so,
there is a healthy dose of graph theory as well. Graph theory meets category is essentially a
vital application of the free category. For more graph theory, one should consult Churchill,
but some brief graph theory definitions are provided here. [8]
Definition 2.5.1. A graph G  xV pGq, EpGqy is a set GpV q called the vertices with a
multiset GpEq  V pGq  V pGq  I, for some index set I, called the edges. The index set
I will often be called EpGq index class.
Given a graph G, a path p  ppE , pV q of order n ¥ 0 in a graph G is a finite sequence
of edges pE  pe1, . . . , enq and a function pV : t0, . . . , nu Ñ V pGq such that ek  pppk 
1q, ppkq, ikq, for each 1 ¤ k ¤ n, for some index ik in the EpGq index class.
A graph homomorphsim h : G Ñ C between a graph G and a category C is a mapping
between them in the following way: h consists of two functions hV : V pGq Ñ ObpCq and
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hE : EpGq Ñ ArpCq such that the following condition is satisfied: hEppx, y, iqq  f , for
some arrow hV pxq
f
ÞÑ hV pyq.
A graph homomorphsim h : G1 Ñ G2 between a graph G1 and another graph G2 is
a mapping between them in the following way: h consists of two functions hV : V pG1q
Ñ V pG2q and hE : EpG1q Ñ EpG2q such that the following condition is satisfied:
hEppx, y, i1qq  phV pxq, hV pyq, i2q, for some index i2 in the EpG2q index class.
Any graph homomorphism h (of both graph and categorical varieties) is said to be a
graph isomorphism if hV and hE is bijective. 4
In this definition, one should also note that there is yet another instance of the multiset,
this time with the definition of edges. This is a practical necessity, since more than one
edge may connect a given pair of vertices, in the same way that there may be more than
one arrow in a category.
Speaking of which, graphs can be thought of in a way as its own category, with paths
(as defined earlier) playing the roll as the arrow, with the domain and codomain being the
start and endpoints of the path respectively. This works because this gives the graph struc-
ture identity and composition. For identity, one has the trivial path of p1xq, with an empty
sequence of edges and a function 1x : t0u Ñ GpV q defined by 1xp0q  x. For composi-
tion, given two paths ppe1, . . . , en1q, p1V q and ppe
1
1, . . . , e
1
n2q, p2V q such that p1pn1q  p2p0q,
one can form the path ppe1, . . . , en1 , e
1
1, . . . , e
1
n2q, p1V p2V q, where p1V p2V : t1, . . . , n1   n2u
defined by p1V p2V pnq  p1pnq for 1 ¤ n ¤ n1 and p1V p2V pnq  p2pnq for n1 ¤ n ¤ n2.
Definition 2.5.2. The path category G1 of a graph G has the object class of vertices
GpV q and arrows the class of all paths GpP q. 4
Defining the category seems easy. But deriving a way to generate functors between two
path categories? Not so much. It would be really nice if one could have a functor C : Grph
Ñ Cat that can generate a functor that goes from a graph homomorphism between two
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graphs and a functor in the path categories. Turns out there is such a functor, but in order
to derive this effectively, one needs the free category. It turns out the path category can
be constructed in another way, which is going to be the diagram provided in the following
definition.
Definition 2.5.3. The graph diagram F : J Ñ Cat of a graph G shall be defined as
follows. F pJq is the category of all categories F pXq for X in J such that there exists
a graph homomorphism ObpF pXqq is surjectively mapped by a graph homomorphism
h : G Ñ F pXq such that hV surjectively maps GpV q to ObpF pXqq. The arrows F pfq for
f in J are functors F pfq : F pXq Ñ F pY q such that given two graph homomorphisms
hY : G Ñ F pXq and hY : G Ñ F pY q such that phY qV and phY qV are surjective and
F pfq hX  hY . (in other words F pfqOb.  phXqV  phY qV and F pfqAr.  phXqE  phY qE)
The free category G generated by a graph G is the free category generated by the
graph diagram F . 4
Lemma 2.5.4. Let h : G Ñ C be a graph homomorphism between a graph G and a
category C. Let G1 be the path category. Then there exists a functor H : G1 Ñ C such that
HOb.pxq  hV pxq and HAr.pppeq, pV qq  hEpeq.
Proof. Let H : ArpG1q Ñ ArpCq be defined by
Hpfq 
$'&
'%
1hV paq, if f  1a for some vertex a in G,
hEpeq, if f is order 1, where f  ppeq, pV q,
Hpf 1qHpsq, if f  f 1s, where f 1 is a path and s is an order 1 path.
We shall first show H is a well-defined function by induction on the order of arrows in G1.
Note that H is defined on all order zero and one arrows of G1. Given that H is defined on
order n arrows, and f is an order n  1 arrow, we find f  f 1s for some order n arrow f 1
and some order 1 arrow s, which completes our inductive hypothesis.
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Next we show that H satisfies the essental conditions for a functor as an arrow mapping.
The condition that for all vertices a in G, there exists some object A in C such that Hp1aq 
1A, is is immediate. Given an arrow f  f1f2, the condition that Hpfq  Hpf1qHpf2q
follows by very straightforward induction on the order of f2.
By construction, we find H is such that HOb.pxq  hV pxq and HAr.pppeq, pV qq  hEpeq.
Lemma 2.5.5. Let G be a graph and G1 be the path category of G, and F : J Ñ Cat be
the graph diagram. G1 is an object of F pJq.
Proof. Define hV : GpV q Ñ G
1 by hV  idGpV q and hE : GpEq Ñ G
1 by hEpeq 
ppeq, pV q. This forms a graph homomorphism h : G Ñ G
1.
Now for the important theorem.
Theorem 2.5.6. Let G be a graph. The free category G generated by G is isomorpihic
to the path category G1 of G.
Proof. Let F : J Ñ Cat be the graph diagram. For every object X in J , choose a graph
homomorphism hX : G Ñ F pXq with the property that phXqV is surjective. By Lemma
2.5.4, we can choose a functor H : G1 Ñ C such that HAr.pppeq, pV qq  hEpeq.
We shall first prove that pG1, Hq is a cone. Given an arrow F pXq
F pfq
ÞÑ F pY q in the graph
diagram, we shall prove that F pfq HX  HY by induction on the order of the path p. If
p is order zero, then p  1a, for some vertex a, and
HY p1aq  1hY paq  1pF pfqhXqpaq  pF pfq HXqp1aq.
If p  ppeq, pV q, and is order 1, we find that HY ppq  hY peq  pF pfq  hXqpeq  pF pfq 
HXqppq. If p is order n   1 and our inductive hypothesis holds for order n, then p  p
1s
for some order n path p1 and order 1 path s, hence
HY ppq  HY pp
1qHY psq  pF pfq HXqpp
1qpF pfq HXqpsq  pF pfq HXqppq.
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We shall now prove that G1 and G are isomorphic. We find by Lemma 2.5.5 that G1 is an
object in F pJq. Note there is some cone pG, φq that forms a limit in F . Then there exists
some unique u : G1 Ñ G such that φG1  µ  HG1 . It is easy to verify that HG1  idG1 .
It follows that φG1 is a left inverse of µ, hence by uniqueness of µ we conclude that µ is a
categorical isomorphism.
While the path category and the free functor has very proven utility, it turns out that
for the purposes of this paper, one needs to construct something fairly more sophisticated
and unfortunately less intuitive. The motivation, however, is simple. It would sometimes
be very nice to construct a category out of a graph that not only is a category but is a
category that has various desired qualities, namely cartesian products, without taking away
any originally desired arrows. Turns out that a bit more creativity with small diagrams
provides exactly this results.
Definition 2.5.7. The cartesian graph diagram F : J Ñ Cat of a graph G shall be
defined as follows. F pJq is the category of all cartesian categories F pXq for X in J such
that ObpF pXqq is surjectively mapped by a graph homomorphism h : GpV q Ñ ObpF pXqq.
The arrows F pfq for f in J are cartesian-preserving functors F pfq : F pXq Ñ F pY q such
that there exsts surjective graph homomorphisms hX : GpV q Ñ ObpF pXqq and hY : GpV q
Ñ ObpF pY qq such that F pfq  hX  hY .
The free cartesian category G generated by a graph G is the free category generated
by the cartesian graph diagram F . 4
This next theorem, like the earlier one, shows what the free cartesian category is.
Essentially, it is the path category except with more arrows–to be precise, exactly the
arrows needed to assure that it is a cartesian category, no more, and no less. The free
cartesian category, as a result, manifests itself in the following way. At this current stage
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of research, although this is an accepted fact, a proof is currently in the working stage
(and not quite finished at this time) so this will simply be an accepted construct.
Theorem 2.5.8. Let G be a graph. The free cartesian category G generated by G has
the following characteristics.
1. G is in the cartesian graph diagram.
2. There exists an embedding functor κ : CpGq Ñ G.
3. f is an arrow in G is an arrow if and only if f is in κpCpGqq or f  f 1ΠiPIfi such
that I is a small index, and f 1 and tfiuiPI are in G
.
Lemma 2.5.9. Let G be a graph and C be a cartesian category. Let H : CpGq Ñ C be a
functor and G be the free cartesian category generated by G. Then there exists a cartesian
functor CH : G Ñ C.
Also this corollary will be very important throughout this text.
Corollary 2.5.10. Let G1 and G2 be graphs. Let G

1 be the free categories generated by G1.
Let G1 and G

2 be the free cartesian categories generated by G1 and G2. The following
are equivalent.
1. There exists a graph homomorphism h : G1 Ñ G

2 .
2. There exists a functor H : G1 Ñ G

2 .
3. There exists a cartesian functor CH : G1 Ñ G

2 .
3
Language and Inference
This Chapter is the center of what this project seeks to do, which is to not only come
up with an adequate definition of “logic”, but also to find a way to appropriately compare
two logics. In logic, it seems like there is not a lot of great ways to compare logic besides
the normal paradigm of classical logic and model theory.
The first section deals with languages and a general analogue that fits most of the
languages that have appeared in logic.
The section section deals with formula vectors, which will suffice to be the objects of a
categorical treatment that will be implemented.
Construction of these formula vector objects set stage for the third section, which very
importantly defines what a logic is and provides a precise definiton of the arrows in this
categorical definition provided. Vital to this is a rigorous definition for inference maps
which overlay the horizontal bar inference scheme.
The fourth section quickly touches on how versatile the inference definition can be by
showing that it can portray hypotheses in the way they ought to be.
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The fifth section makes a sort of semantics that will prove very helpful in this logic as
they are “functoral semantics”. This will allow us to compare logics and give us a richer
sense of “soundness” and “completeness”.
Finally, for more general notions of semantics, a general notion of “truth tables” will
be created as a class of “valuation mappings” that one can think of as “possible worlds”
as sometimes one thinks of in model theory.
3.1 Languages
Whether one knows it or not, when one reads, writes, and speaks math, one is working
with a language that is not English! Or rather, math is a language that deep to its core has
a very constructive nature, whereas with a literary language such as English one typically
takes the constructive rules one has (such as grammar, sentence, even idiomatic structure)
as they are, not really concerned with analyzing the nature of the language’s construction
itself.
While most mathemeticians do not really go as in depth with the language’s construc-
tion as the typical logician, most concern themselves with the basic structure in what
they are studying. For example, with a group, topology, poset, etc., they concern them-
selves just as much with the inherent structure of what the object is as we are with its
consequences.
This first definition tries to stay true to this strong tradition in mathematics hereby
described–which is often called “rigor”. It also tries to generally define what logicians have
defined for as long as Tarski, which is the notion of “language”: Something mathemeticians
use in every day math.
Definition 3.1.1. A Language L consists most basically of a class of formula called
Form. This class is defined recursively as follows.
3. LANGUAGE AND INFERENCE 32
1. Atomic Formula: A class of atomic formula Atom.
2. Propositional Connectives: conj , for each j P J , where J is a finite index set. Each
propositional connective is a mapping of a finite integer n ¥ 0 of propositions to another
proposition conj : Form
n Ñ Form In other words, if φ1, . . . , φn are all propositions then
conjpφ1, . . . , φnq forms a new proposition that is linguistically distinct from any atomic
prior proposition. 4
As one might infer from this definition, math is hard, but at least the language behind
it is simple. In other words, there are these “atomic” things that is taken at the most
basic level of formula composition and then join formulae together with connectives to
make new formula. And the kicker: ALL of our statements in the language can be broken
down into that atomic formulae joined together by connectives. If only English behaved
that way. Here are some examples that are prevalent in logic.
Example 3.1.2. The most basic example of a language is a propositional language with
Atom being composed of “propositional variables” p1, p2, . . . , pn, . . . and “propositional
constants” K,J with connectives _,^, ,Ñ. This language shall be more rigorously in
Chapter 4, and this paper will work with variants of this sort of language throughout. ♦
Example 3.1.3. One of the most applied sort of language of all logic is called the “first
order predicate language”. This language is more complex in the sense that its Atom class
is constructed from a Term class made up of the following.
1. Variables: A class of variables V ars consisting of one symbol for each natural number
x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . ..
2. Constants: A class of constant symbols ck indexed by some arbitrary K. What exactly
(and how many of) these constant symbols there are varies from language to language.
3. Functions: For each n P N, a class of countably many n-ary function symbols fn : Termn
Ñ Term.
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The class Atom is then constructed through the usual K,J constants. But our “proposi-
tional variables” are more elaborately n-ary relation symbols Rn (up to countably many
for each n P N), such as  (this one appears quite frequently), which take n terms and
form our atomic formulas. This is to say, Rnpt1, . . . , tnq P Atom, for pt1, . . . , tnq P Term
n.
We then have the usual connectives _,^, ,Ñ, as our last example. But we also have
quantifiers @, D, which are not exactly connectives but can be defined using connectives.
We define Qx : Form Ñ Form as a connective, for every variable x and a given quantifier
Q. So @xφ and Dxφ would be a formulae, and @x and Dx would be a connectives. ♦
Example 3.1.4. The next language is an expanded version of the “First Order Predicate
Language” called the “Second Order Predicate Language.” There is the class Term1,
which are “first order terms” which contain only the variable and constant classes as
described in the last example. But what really distinguishes this language is that there
are a class of second order terms called Term2, which essentially contains “predicate
symbols” that show up in n-ary form for each n P N. These n-ary predicate symbols
are either variables Xn1 , X
n
2 , . . . , X
n
m, . . ., for which are indexed by N, or constants Pnk
indexed by an arbitrary Kn. Atomic formulas are not of the form T
npt1, . . . , tnq, where
Tn P Term2 and pt1, . . . , tnq P Term1. The connectives and quantifiers are still _,^, ,Ñ
,K,J and @, D, except that the quantifiers are now able to quantify variables from Term2
in addition to those from Term1 (in other words @Xn and DXn are connectives for each
n-ary variable). ♦
Example 3.1.5. This one is not prevalent in logic...but maybe it should be. A general
kind of language that we shall be dealing with (a term that I as the writer made up,
but for good reason) is called the “Meta-Language” M. The idea is that when there is a
language and the metalinguistic usage becomes so vast with symbols and rules, such as
with sequents, that it necessitates a language of its own. This language shall be defined
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more rigorously in Chapter 5, but the basic idea is that formulas FormL in a base language
L become our new class of terms, and our class of formulas FormM become n-ary relation
symbols that operate on FormL. ♦
Keep in mind that within the context of this paper, the main (and most inherently
basic) language dealt with is that of the propositional variety. While predicate languages
(ones that utilize quantifiers) are very important in mathematics (and not to mention
computer science), introducing quantifiers in a reasonably rigorous way involve a level of
technical sophistication that clouds what is really going on with the nature of deductive
systems.
3.2 Formula Vectors
Typically in logic, one makes theorems about a relation between a given set of formulas
and a single formula. That is to say, the relations look something like Γ $ φ or Γ ( φ,
where Γ is a set of formulas (of arbitrary cardinality) and φ is a formula. This is a very
unideal relation to work with since the relation is one that relates between two different
domains of objects. Wouldn’t it be nicer if relations like $ and ( were binary relations on
a given domain?...especially if such relations happened to have had a transitive property
where Γ1 $ Γ2 and Γ2 $ Γ3 ùñ Γ1 $ Γ3?
Turns out that can be done. This is where the category theory will come in. In a
potential categorical scheme of a given language, which is the plan for this section, this
definition gives the notion of objects in the category that will be worked with. However,
there are two important disclaimers to address as to why this definition was chosen to be
the way it is, which at first definitely appears odd.
The first disclaimer:“formula vectors” were decided instead of “sets of formulas”. This
is because vector objects are better-suited for some of the later definitions than sets ever
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will be; and while there is trade offs that results from this definition, they are nothing
that does not have a straightforward fix. The second disclaimer follows from the first:
Exclusively finite “formula vectors” were decided on instead of possibly infinite formula
vectors (which could have been done by defining my formula vectors using functional
mappings f : J Ñ Form, for any index set J of cardinality |J | ¤ |Form|). The decision
was not including infinite vectors because they are a big complication that makes the
system harder to work with, and for less theorecal insight than some of the other things
that could be given atention.
Definition 3.2.1. Given a language L, a L-vector is an ordered pair of L-formulas. The
set of all L-vecters we shall denote as V. Note that in addition to all ordered pairs of order
n ¥ 1,the “empty” vector shall be included with no tuples and call it ~0.
Additionally defined are some operations on V. Suppose Γ  xθ1, . . . , θny and ∆ 
xφ1, . . . , φmy.
First defined is x,y on V by xΓ,∆y  xθ1, . . . , θn, φ1, . . . , φmy. An anologous more
general definition will be given for x, . . . ,ylooooomooooon
n times
.
Then defined the projection mapping pii on V for each i ¥ 1, provided that a given
vector has an i-th tuple. This is to say that piipΓq  θi, for every 1 ¤ i ¤ n, but is
undefined for all i ¡ n.
Next, defined is the order of a given L-vector as the number of tuples it contains, and
notate it |Γ|, that is to say |Γ|  n.
Finally defined is the binary relation ¨ on V, so then Γ ¨ ∆ if and only if for every
1 ¤ i ¤ |Γ|, there is some 1 ¤ j ¤ |∆| such that piipΓq  pijp∆q. 4
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3.3 Inferences and Proofs
Out of everything in this whole paper, this specific section out of all sections of all is
perhaps the MOST IMPORTANT out of everything written. This is because the rest of
this paper cannot do what it has done without first going back and placing sufficiently
general definitions that can be rigorously worked with. Once that has been accomplished,
the nature of deductions, the nature of metamath, becomes arithmatic–and that is just
beautiful!
First, here is a definition of an “inference rule” that is pretty standard for the most
part.
Definition 3.3.1. In a language L, an Inference Rule is an ordered pair xΓ, φy, where
Γ is an L-formula vector and φ is an L-formula. 4
Now here is something that is not really standard at all. When dealing with inference
rules, many mathematical texts simply take it for granted that we can take a collection of
these “inference rules” and make an algorithmic “horizontal bar style”’ equation that is
supposed to make sense. But in order to work meaningfully with this “horizontal bar style”
thing, one should, like anything, define it rigorously, and this is done here as standard as
a functional mapping.
Definition 3.3.2. An Inference Map I is a family of inference rules txΓ, φΓyuΓPΩ indexed
by some Ω  V. In other words, it corresponds to a function I : Ω Ñ V. When defining
inference maps, very standard horizontal bar notation shall be used. So IpΓq  ∆ shall be
written as
pi1pΓq pi2pΓq . . . pi|Γ|pΓq
I,
∆
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although it will be very convenient to not just write the projections spaced, but simply
Γ
I.
∆
4
Next we define a logic, which is something of a new abstract concept, inspired by the
“set with structure” motif. Except what a logic is, and what it really always has been,
is a language with additional inference structure that allow one to make deductions. The
structure will be a set of inference maps that will establish the framework for how the logi
to work.
Definition 3.3.3. A Logic L is an ordered pair xL,T y, where L is a language and T
is a finite family of inference rules. 4
Now, with the inference rules, it’s crucial to generate a deductive system that behaves
categorically. By defining inference maps, essentially half the battle has been won, which
is to have our “one step proofs”, by going from the inference input to the inference output.
But now one must be able to 1. make proofs that combine our “one step proofs” and 2.
find a way to keep our proof closed under products in the way that one would want. This
is where “free cartesian categories”–which was focused in chapter two towards deriving–
come in very handy. This is because free categories essentially say that the category that
one “wants” to have exists, as one shall witness from the following definition.
Definition 3.3.4. A language L, an Logic is an ordered pair xΓ,∆y, where Γ,∆ are
L-formula vectors. The Deductive Graph GpL q generated by L is defined as follows:
Vertices: All formula vectors in L.
Edges: An edge xΓ,∆y between two formula vectors Γ and ∆ exist if and only if
1. There is a projection map pii such that Γ
piiÞÑ ∆. In other words, if Γ  xφ1, . . . , φny,
then ∆  φi, for some 1 ¤ i ¤ n. These edges shall be called projection edges
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2. There is an inference map I P T such that
Γ
I.
∆
These edges shall be called inference edges.
Let the Deductive Category CpL q be the free cartesian category generated by GpL q.
4
Remark 3.3.5. If there exists a path between two formula vectors Γ and ∆ in a given
logic we shall metalinguistically write Γ " ∆...or Γ $ ∆, Γ ( ∆, and other symbols
corresponding to standard notation in the particular logic with which we are working. ♦
Now here is proof that this category has desired properties.
Lemma 3.3.6. Let Γ,∆1,∆2 be formula vectors in a logic L . Suppose Γ " ∆1 and
∆1 " ∆2. Then Γ " ∆2.
Proof. By hypothesis there exists two arrows Γ
f
ÞÑ ∆1 and ∆1
g
ÞÑ ∆2 in CpL q, so our
conclusion follows from existance of the arrow Γ
gf
ÞÑ ∆2.
Lemma 3.3.7. Let Γ,∆ be formula vectors in L . If Γ " piip∆q for each 1 ¤ i ¤ |∆|,
then Γ " ∆.
Proof. Follows from CpL q being a cartesian category.
Proposition 3.3.8. Let Γ1,Γ2 be formula vectors in L . If Γ1 ¨ Γ2, then Γ2 " Γ1.
Proof. Suppose Γ1 ¨ Γ2. Then by definition, we have Γ2 " piipΓ1q, for each 1 ¤ i ¤ |Γ1|.
It follows from Lemma 2.3.7 that Γ2 " Γ1.
Corollary 3.3.9. Let Γ1,Γ2,∆ be formula vectors in L . If Γ1 " ∆ and Γ1 ¨ Γ2, then
Γ2 " ∆.
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It shall moreover be useful to define “logical equivalence” in the category CCpL q, since
categorically it is possible to run into scenarios where both Γ " ∆ and ∆ " Γ. This holds
a lot of theoretical significance since being able to deduce one thing from another and
vice versa captures the essence of “logical equivalence”–similar to what has been captured
before in a language with something like φØ ϕ. But this new convention can do something
more general metalinguistically.
Definition 3.3.10. Let Γ and ∆ be formula vectors in a given logic L  xL,T y. If
Γ " ∆ and ∆ " Γ, we shall call these two vectors Logically Equivalent and denote this
quality with the notation Γ !" ∆ (or alternatively Γ %$ ∆, Γ )( ∆, etc.).
Furthermore, the definition of derivability shall be extended in terms of inference maps.
Sn inference map I : Ω Ñ V shall be said to be Derivable in a given logic L , and write
L " I if Γ " IpΓq, for every Γ P Ω. 4
It is firstly important to understand !" is an equivalence relation.
Lemma 3.3.11. In a given logic L , !" is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Reflexivity follows from Lemma 3.3.8 since Γ ¨ Γ, for every formula vector Γ.
Symmetry follows by definition. Transitivity follows directly from Lemma 3.3.6.
One should ask themselves what one would “want” to be logically equivalent. What should
be logically eqivalent, first off, is when two vectors of the same order contain the same
tuples but are not necessarily the same order. Actually...more generally want two formula
vectors Γ,∆ such that Γ ¨ ∆ and ∆ ¨ Γ to be logically equivalent, which follows from
two uses of Proposition 2.3.7. The following corollaries shall be presented to make the
point clear, but with their proofs omitted.
Corollary 3.3.12. Let Γ,∆ be formula vectors such that Γ ¨ ∆ and ∆ ¨ Γ. Then
Γ !" ∆.
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Corollary 3.3.13. Let xφ1, . . . , φny be a formula vector in a logic L and let σ be a
permutation on n. Then xφ1, . . . , φny !" xφσp1q, . . . , φσpnqy.
Definition 3.3.14. We shall define Basic Arrows in a given logic L as follows:
1. If Γ,∆ are formula vectors such that ∆ ¨ Γ, we shall call the unique arrow–that exists
by virtue of projection edges existing from Γ to piip∆q, for each 1 ¤ i ¤ |∆|–a Projection
Arrow
2. If Γ,∆ are formula vectors such that ∆ ¨ Γ and there exists an inference edge pΓ,∆q,
then the arrow Γ
P
ÞÑ ∆ mapped by pΓ,∆q is called an Inference Arrow
Any arrow that is not an basic arrow is called a composite arrow. We shall call any arrow
between Γ and ∆ generated by a family of arrows from Γ to piip∆q, for each 1 ¤ i ¤ |∆|,
a product arrow.
Finally, the order of an arrow will be defined recursively as follows: Given a single-product
composite arrow, the order is defined as the number of inference arrows used to compose it.
Given a product arrow, take the maximum order of the projection arrows used to compose
it. 4
Do note that the nature of the free category allows this definition to work properly.
3.4 Natural Deduction and Hypotheses
While my definition for inference rules is a very rigorous definition that embodies
essentially what they are, up until this point there has not been a rigorous treatment
of hypotheses...such as the sort of chargin and discharging of hypotheses that one would
frequently see in classical/intuitionistic propositional/predicate logic, such as
rφs



ϕ
Ñ I
φÑ ϕ
In this section, the much needed answer is provided.
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The answer is doing what will be done a lot in this paper, which is to be clever with the
domain of the inference map. The inference map will map all inference vectors such that a
hypothesized vector incorporated with theoriginal vector reaches a given conclusion vector.
The input of the inference map, is then defined into components that are the hypothesis
component and conclusion component. This gets us something rigorous that essentially
makes hypotheses work the way one would like.
Definition 3.4.1. A hypothesis inference map in a given language L is an inference
map H : ΩΓ Ñ V, where ΩΓ  V such that for each ∆ P ΩΓ, we have ∆ : xΦ,∆1y such
that xΓ,Φy " ∆1. Γ shall be called the hypothesis componenet of ∆ and ∆1 shall be
called the conclusion component. Such an inference map is written
rΓs



∆1
H,
Hp∆q
where Γ and ∆1 are the hypothesis and conclusion components respectively. 4
More generally, there might be more than one hypothesis and conclusion component.
For instance,
φ_ ϕ
rφs



θ
rϕs



θ
_E,
θ
in the usual propositional logic. To deal with that, there inference map could instead
compose of as many vectors of hypothesis and conclusion components as needed. This is
done in the next definition
Definition 3.4.2. Extending the earlier definition, a hypothesis inference map H : ΩΓ
Ñ V in a given language L more generally is defined as follows. Γ : xΓ1, . . . ,Γny and
∆ : xΦ,∆11, . . . ,∆
1
ny such that for every 1 ¤ i ¤ n, we have xΓi,Φy " ∆
1
i. Each Γi and ∆
1
i
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are called hypothesis and conclusion components for each 1 ¤ i ¤ n, and shall be written
rΓ1s



∆11 . . .
rΓns



∆1n
H,
Hp∆q
Where Γi and ∆
1
i are hypothesis and conclusion components respectively for each 1 ¤ i ¤
n. 4
3.5 Functoral Semantics
This section is where the law of the land is laid down as far as “semantics” go. Typically
in logic (as it is presented in a typical introductory course), one thinks of semantics as
a disdinct notion from that of so-called “natural deduction” and “proof theory”. This
paper is of the opinion that this approach misses the point at what semantics intends to
do, which is capture the meaning and interpretation of a given system. Really the way
“semantics” as one has seen, i.e. truth tables and models, captures the way a given system
works through entailment, is really in and of itself a kind of logical deduction.
What is meant by this? This means that the deductive category we’ve been using
captures the essence of model theory AS WELL AS proof theory. There are objects that
are generated by the language, and there are arrows that are brought about by “truth
tables” which embody the most exquisite of inference rules in a way that shall soon be
explored. That is all there really is to it.
In this perspective, so-called “soundness” and “completeness” shed a new, more com-
plete, light. As a result of this categorical treatment, one can now talk about soundness
and completeness as a relation between two different “logics”, as opposed to one between
“truth” and “provability”. And yes, truth table/interpretation entailment in a given lan-
guage IS a logic, now, different from so-called “propositional logic” or “propositional cal-
culus”.
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Now what is important with soundness from one logics L1 to L2 is two things: 1. That
every derivation arrow in CpL1q can be expressed as a derivation arrow in CpL2q via a
functor F 2. The image of the functor F captures essentially all of the logical system of
CpL2q. To clarify what is meant by 2, here is what one would not want for a definition of
soundness: Simply having a more existance of functors between the two logics. The would
make logics sound between each other that really shouldn’t be, via a fixed functor that
just sends a bunch of arrows to an identity arrow.
One way to fix this problem is to require that F is surjective, which definitely fixes up
a lot. However, this seems like too strong of a criteria. What about two logics L1 and L2
such that the language of L1 is a sublanguage of L2. It is certainly the case, for example,
(and something that will be derived in the next chapter) that all of classical propositional
logic can be derived using the connectives Ñ,K. One states this because every statement
in propositional logic is logically equivalent to some formula that is formed only using
Ñ,K.
It seems like the remedy is for the criteria to be existence of a surjective functor F
between an equivalence class category CpL1q{ !" and CpL2q{ C B, where " and B
denotes derivability in L1 and L2 respectively, and for this paper that in the end will be
the convention that shall be adapted. However, the main hurdle to this definition is that
a “quotient category” CpL1q{ !" in the desired sense has not been defined yet. What
is desired is a functor Q that maps objects to their equivalence classes in the sense that
the only thing that changes about the arrow structure is that the domain and codomain
become the analogous equivalence class. In other words, each arrow is injectively mapped
by Q even though the objects are surjectively mapped by Q to the quotient classes.
The question is if such an arrow exists. Turns out it does, but a few specific tools need
to be defined before proving such a notion.
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Definition 3.5.1. Let G be a graph. Let  be an equivalence relation on V . The quotient
graph G{  of G with respect to  is a graph such that G{  pV q is the quotient set
GpV q{  and two equivalence classes rus, rvs and an index i of the GpEq index set forms
an edge prus, rvs, iq in G{  pEq if and only if pu, v, iq forms an edge in GpEq.
The forgetful functor U : Cat Ñ Grph is the functor defined by UpCq UpHqÞÑ UpDq being
a graph homomorphism between two graphs defined in the following way.
1. For any category C, UOb.pCq is the graph with the vertices as ObpCq and edges pa, b, fq
indexed by the arrows a
f
ÞÑ b in C.
2. For any functor F : C Ñ D, UpF q : UpCq Ñ UpDq is the graph homomorism
(easy to verify it as such) Such that UpF qV paq  FOb.paq and UpF qEppa, b, fqq 
pF paq, F pbq, F pfqq.
It is easy to verify that U is a functor. A treatment of the forgetful functor can be found
in Mac Lane. [7] 4
Now the existance of a desired functor Q can be recognized.
Lemma 3.5.2. Given any logic L , there exists a Q : CpL q Ñ D, where D is a category,
such that.
1. QpΓq  rΓs, where rΓs is the Γ equivalence class of the relation !".
2. Q is a cartesian functor.
3. Q maps arrows injectively.
Proof. Let L be a logic. Let G  UpCpL qq, where U : Cat Ñ Grph is the forgetful
functor. Let G{ !" be the quotient graph generated by the relation !". Let q : G Ñ
G{ !" be the quotient homomorphism from G to G{ !". By design we find qE is injective.
Let D  CpGq, where CC : Grph Ñ Cat is the free cartesian category functor. Define
hE : G Ñ CpGq by hEpeq  fe, where fe is the order 1 path corresponding to the edge
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e. It is easy to verify that hEqE  phqqE is injective, hence the functor Q : CpL q Ñ D
generated by hq exists that follows conditions 1.-3. as advertised.
Now soundness can be defined as desirable.
Definition 3.5.3. Given any logic L , the quotient deductive category is the image
QpCpL qq of the functor Q as it is described in Lemma 3.5.1. This category shall be
written CpL q{ !". Moreover, Q shall be called quotient functor of the category CpL q.
Let L1 and L2 be two logics. L1 is said to be sound on L2 if there exists a cartesian
functor F  : CpL1q{ !"Ñ CpL2q{ !" such that F Ob. is surjective. L1 is said to be
complete on L2 if L2 is sound on L1.
Two logics L1 and L2 are said to be deduction class equivilent if there exists a
cartesian functor F  : CpL1q{ !"Ñ CpL2q{CB such that F Ob. is bijective. 4
The first thing to notice about this definition is that there is this notion of deduction
class equivalence, which is really classifying two logics as “essentially the same”. This
notion of “essentially the same” is inspired by why one views propositional classical logic
defined only in a language with the Ñ,K connectives as the same logic as one defined
with more connectives: And that is because there is a one-to-one correspondence between
derivability inference maps. Also, one might notice that completeness has been defined
here as well, which is really just soundness in the opposite direction. Once one sees some
of the applications of this definition, this link will be very evident.
To get into some of the applications of this definition of soundness, it will help to define
some special cases where the criteria is met. These next few lemmas will derive some of
these conditions. The first is simply finding the functor F between two logic categories
CpL1q and CpL2q that is surjectively maps the object class. It suffices to assume that
a graph homomorphism exists since this paper has shown that constructing the two is
equivalent by Corollary 2.5.11.
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Lemma 3.5.4. Let L1 and L2 be two logics on the same language. Let " and B be the
derivability relations for L1 and L2 respectively. If there exists a graph homomorphism
h : GpL1q Ñ CpL2q such that hV is surjective, then L1 is sound on L2.
Proof. Define H : CpL1q{ !"Ñ CpL2q{CB such that Hprf sq  rHpfqs. It is easy to
verify that H is a well-defined functor. Given r∆s in CpL2q{CB, we find there is some
Γ in CpL1q such that HpΓq  ∆, hence r∆s  rHpΓqs  HprΓsq.
Now an even more special case will be derived that will bring lots of utility these next few
chapters.
Proposition 3.5.5. Let L1 and L2 be two logics on the same language L. Let " and B
be the derivability relations for L1 and L2 respectively. If there exists a graph homomor-
phism h : GpL1q Ñ CpL2q such that hV pΓq  Γ, then L1 is sound on L2. Moreover, the
following are eqivalent.
1. There exists a graph homomorphism h : GpL1q Ñ CpL2q such that hV pΓq  Γ
2. Γ " ∆ implies ΓB∆.
3. The inference maps of L1 are all derivable by L2.
Proof. Soundness follows directly from Lemma 3.5.4. For the next part, we shall do
1. ùñ 2. ùñ 3. ùñ 1.
1. ùñ 2. There exists a graph homomorphism h : GpL1q Ñ CpL2q such that hV pΓq  Γ.
Then there exists a functor H : CpL1q Ñ CpL2q such that HpΓq  Γ. Our conclusion
follows.
2. ùñ 3. Suppose Γ " ∆ implies Γ B∆. Given an inference map I in L1, we find that
ΓB IpΓq, since Γ " IpΓq.
3. ùñ 1. Suppose the inference maps of L1 are derivable by L2. For every inference
edge pΓ,∆, iq in GpL1q, we find ΓB∆. Then for every inference edge e  pΓ,∆, iq, choose
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some Γ
fe
ÞÑ ∆ in CpL2q. Define hE : EpGpL1qq Ñ ArpCpL2qq by hEpeq  fe. This forms
the graph homomorphism h : GpL1q Ñ CpL2q as advertised.
3.6 Valuation Logic
Now, we bring our attention to the next concept of this section, and that is what I shall
call “valuation logic”. Essentially, it is a generalized notion of “truth tables” , or more
rigorously, “model theory” of first-order/propositional languages.
Definition 3.6.1. Let L be a language. A Valuation Class on L (which we shall also
call a L-Valuation Class), is a class V al of “valuation mappings” v : Form Ñ t0, 1u.
Moreover, for any L-valuation class V al, the Valuation Inference Map V generated by
V al is the inference map such that
Γ
V
∆
,
if and only if vppiipΓqq  1, for all v P V al and 1 ¤ i ¤ |Γ|, implies vppijp∆qq  1, for all
1 ¤ j ¤ |∆|.
Note that LV  xL, tV uy forms a logic, which we shall call a Valuation Logic, or a
V -Logic when being specific to the particular semantic inference map V . 4
As seen from the definition, valuation is defined as a logic, but just because it’s layed it
out “proof theoretically” does not mean there is a lot of proving that is done on this system.
Valuation logics still retain their model theoretic structure and hence their applications.
For the “deduction” to determine whether Γ (V ∆ is often to declare “∆ is always true in
LV .” In fact, the following proposition says one can find Γ (V ∆ if and only if there exists
an inference edge. This result corresponds valuation mappings as they are traditionally
done, since (V is a metalinguistic relation that holds if and only if the right side is true for
all possible valuations that the left side is true. This principle holds in this more general
definition.
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Proposition 3.6.2. Γ (V ∆ if and only if there exists an inference edge pΓ,∆, iq in
GpLV q generated by V .
Proof. pΓ,∆, iq in GpLV q implying Γ (V ∆ is trivial. Conversely suppose Γ (V ∆. Then
there exists some arrow Γ
f
ÞÑ ∆. We shall prove this by structural induction by arrows in
CpLV q that the domain and codomain corresponds to an edge. In the base case that f
is an order 1 path, if f is an inference edge, we are done. If f is a projection edge, then
∆ ¨ Γ, so vppikpΓqq  1, for each 1 ¤ k ¤ |Γ|, implies vppikp∆qq  1, for each 1 ¤ k ¤ |∆|.
In the first inductive step where f  f 1s for an order n path Γ
f 1
ÞÑ Γ1 and an order
1 path Γ1
s
ÞÑ ∆. We find vppikpΓqq  1, for all valuations v and 1 ¤ k ¤ |Γ| implies
vppikpΓ
1qq  1, for all valuations v and 1 ¤ k ¤ |Γ1|, which further implies vppikp∆jqq  1,
for all 1 ¤ k ¤ |∆j | and for all 1 ¤ j ¤ n.
In the inductive step, suppose f  f 1pΠnj1fkq such that the inductive hypothesis applies to
Γ
f 1
ÞÑ Γ1 and Γ
fj
ÞÑ ∆j for each 1 ¤ j ¤ n. By inductive hypothesis, we find vppikpΓqq  1, for
all valuations v and 1 ¤ k ¤ |Γ| implies vppikpΓ
1qq  1, for all valuations v and 1 ¤ k ¤ |Γ1|,
which further implies vppikp∆jqq  1, for all 1 ¤ k ¤ |∆j | and for all 1 ¤ j ¤ n. Since
∆  x∆1, . . . ,∆ny, we conclude vppikpΓqq  1, for all valuations v and 1 ¤ k ¤ |Γ| implies
vppikp∆qq  1, for all valuations v and 1 ¤ k ¤ |∆|.
Now, it’s a good idea to look at some examples!
Example 3.6.3. Let us look at the complete semantic for propositional classic logic. This
can be straightforwardly defined as the class of valuation maps V such that each v P V
has the following two properties: 1. vpKq  0. 2. vpφÑ ϕq  maxt1 vpφq, vpϕqu. ♦
Example 3.6.4. Classic Predicate First Order Logic is a little more complicated, since
generally we look at semantics in terms of so-called “interpretations” of “language-
structures” (often notated A for a given language structure and LpAq for the interpre-
tation) in place of valuation mappings. But that doesn’t mean we can be clever with our
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valuation mappings and not capture the semantics of predicate logic. Each interpretation
of a given language structure LpAq valuation map can be regarded as a valuation map
vLpAq : Prop Ñ t0, 1u that works given a condition associated with the variable assign-
ment of LpAq. So if φ is atomic, then vLpAqpφq  1 if and only if φLpAq P R
n
A for some
n-ary relation (including “”). With connectives, we have the propositional rules stated
in Example 2.5.6 plus the quantifier rule: vp@xφq  mintvpφrx|asq | a P |A|u, where |A|
is the set of constant symbols corresponding to A. ♦
4
Classical Propositional Logic
This chapter shall explore how this paper’s rigorous treatment of logic in the previous
Chapter works on one of the more basic and popular form of logics: Classic propositional
logic. Note that with classical propositional logic, there are a great many ways to define
the language and axiomize the system. As any mathematician knows, there are the con-
nectives ^,_,Ñ,Ø, ,K,J. As any logic-savy mathematician definitely knows, we can
form classical propositional logic from a language consisting of two connectives/constants
and a few inference maps. All the other connectives we can derive in terms of those two.
For example, a language with propositional variables plus the connectives _ and  , we are
able to talk about ^ as φ^ϕ :  p φ_ ϕq, Ñ as φÑ ϕ :  φ_ϕ, K as K: p1^ p1,
for some atomic proposition p1, and so on.
In this paper, the minimal approach shall be used by defining the language in terms
of the least amount of connectives, since it leads to much more efficient proofs with less
redundant cases. But instead of _, , it will be most convenient to use Ñ,K for the
simple reason that it is most eloquent in defining this system, especially bearing in mind
that intuitionistic propositional logic is around the corner in the next chapter. The way
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propositional logic is derived, here, ought to be as analogous to intuitionistic as possible,
not only to save tedious derivations but to make clear what exactly is changing between
the two systems.
The sections of the chapter will break down as follows. In the first section, the deductive
system shall be defined and derive some of its properties will be derived, both the usual
ones but also some new ones that are unique this paper’s categorical approach. The second
section shall show that the minimal approach to the logic results in a “deduction class
equivalent” logic to a similar sort of logic that defines all its connectives initially. The third
section shall define the valuation logic (as it is usually done) that this paper claims classical
propositional logic is sound and complete on. Finally, the fourth section shall quickly verify
the result classical propositional logic is sound and complete on this valuation logic.
4.1 The Classical Language and Deductive System
Definition 4.1.1. The Classical Propositional Language denoted LC is defined as
follows
1. The class Atom. contains an element pi, called a Propositional Variable, for each
i ¥ 1.
2. The connectives in LC include the constant K and the binary connective Ñ.
Furthermore, we shall further define the connectives  ,_,^,Ø,J as shorthand notation
for the following:
1.  φ : φÑK
2. φ_ ϕ :  φÑ ϕ,
3. φ^ ϕ :  p φ_ ϕq,
4. φØ ϕ : pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq,
5. J :  K. 4
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before defining exact logic on LC , this next definition will be provided as a reference
to what some prominent inference maps of note in LC .
Definition 4.1.2. These inference maps on LC will be named as follows:
1.
rφs



ϕ
Ñ I,
φÑ ϕ
φ φÑ ϕ
Ñ E,
ϕ
2.
rφs



K
 I,
 φ
φ  φ
 E,
ϕ
3.
φ
_I1,
φ_ ϕ
ϕ
_I2,
φ_ ϕ φ_ ϕ
rφs



θ
rϕs



θ
_E,
θ
4.
φ ϕ
^I,
φ^ ϕ
φ^ ϕ
^E1,
φ
φ^ ϕ
^E2,
ϕ
5.
K
K,
φ
J,
J
6.
φÑ ϕ ϕÑ φ
Ø I,
φØ ϕ
φØ ϕ
Ø E1,
φÑ ϕ
φØ ϕ
Ø E2,
ϕÑ φ
7.
  φ
RAA,
φ
LEM.
φ_ φ
4
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Now we are not quite up to the point where we define classical propositional logic yet;
the definition shall first be motivated–and the careful way this language was defined–to
show that contrary to popular belief, one is not obligated to have the law of excluded
middle LEM or for that matter reducto ad absurdum RAA as an inference maps for
the logic, for the language is set up such that Ñ I,Ñ E alone can derive LEM , and
Ñ I,Ñ E,_E,K can derive RAA. In fact, the proposition below tells even more: The
logic xLC , tÑ I,Ñ E,_E,Kuy is sound and complete on xLC , tÑ I,Ñ E,RAAuy.
Proposition 4.1.3. 1. For the logic L  xLC , tÑ I,Ñ Euy, we find that LEM is
derivable.
2. The logic LC  xLC , tÑ I,Ñ E,_E,Kuy is sound and complete with the logic L 1 
xLC , tÑ I,Ñ E,RAAuy.
Proof. 1. Note that φ_ φ :  φÑ  φ. We find
r φs1
_I1.
φ_ φ
2. It shall suffice to prove that RAA is derivable by LC and K and _E is derivable by
L 1. The derivations go as follows:
RAA in LC .
LEM
φ_ φ rφs1
r φs1   φ
_E
K
K
φ
_E1.
φ
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_E in L 1.
rφs1



θ r θs2
Ñ E
K
Ñ I1
 φ φ_ ϕ
Ñ E
ϕ



θ r θs2
Ñ E
K
Ñ I2
  θ
RAA.
θ
K in L 1.
K
Ñ I1
  φ
RAA.
φ
Since the proof of this proposition shows that all inference maps of L are derivable in LC
and vice versa, Proposition 3.5.5 deduces the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1.4. Let L and LC (as they are defined in Proposition 4.1.3) are deduc-
tion class equivalent.
It has been seen before that the logic xLC , tÑ I,Ñ E,RAAuy is sufficient for classical
propositional logic; however, xLC , tÑ I,Ñ E,_E,Kuy is just as sufficient a choice...apart
from the fact that the latter has more inference maps. But this one time, efficiency and
conciseness shall be sacrificed for a method of proof that will be more analogous to intu-
itionistic propositional logic down the road.
Definition 4.1.5. The logic LC  xLC , tÑ I,Ñ E,_E,Kuy shall be called Classical
Propositional Logic. 4
Now for the big proposition showing that the other inference maps of note can be derived.
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Proposition 4.1.6. The inference rules  I,  E, _I1, _I2, ^I, ^E1, ^E2, J, Ø I,
Ø E1, Ø E2 are all derivable in LC .
Proof. Note throughout the proof that  φ : φÑK.
 I. Since  φ : φÑK, this is just a special case of Ñ I
 E.
φ  φ
Ñ E,
K
K .
ϕ
_I1. Note that φ_ ϕ : pφÑKq Ñ ϕ. We find
φ r φs1
Ñ E
K
K
ϕ
Ñ I1.
φ_ ϕ
_I2.
ϕ
Ñ I1.
φ_ ϕ
^I. Remember that φ^ ϕ :  p φ_ ϕq. By _E proved in part 2., we find
r φ_ ϕs2
φ r φs1
Ñ E
K
ϕ r ϕs1
Ñ E
K
_E1
K
Ñ I2.
φ^ ϕ
^E1. By _I1 proved in part 1., we find
r φs1
_I1
 φ_ ϕ φ^ ϕ
Ñ E
K
Ñ I1
  φ
RAA.
φ
^E2. is similar except using _I2, also proved in part 1., in place of _I1.
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J. Remember that J :  K. We find
rKs1
Ñ I1.
J
Ø I. Since φØ ϕ : pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq, this is just a special case of ^I.
Ø E1. Just a special case of ^E1.
Ø E2. Just a special case of ^E2.
There is an important question looking at the logical structure of LC . There is a
symbolic way Ñ of expressing logical implication $ in the language. That is to say that
if we find $ φ Ñ ϕ, that is the same as finding φ $ ϕ. That is nothing new. But with
the metalinguistic symbol %$ of logical equivalence between formula vectors, it should be
that %$ behaves nicely with Ø, which is shown in this corollary.
Corollary 4.1.7. Let φ, ϕ be LC-formulas.
1. φ $ ϕ if and only if $ φÑ ϕ,
2. φ %$ ϕ if and only if $ φØ ϕ.
Proof. For part 1, we have φ $ ϕ ùñ $ φÑ ϕ from Ñ I and the converse from Ñ E.
For part 2, remember that φØ ϕ : pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq. If φ %$ ϕ, then by part 1., we
have $ φÑ ϕ, and $ ϕÑ φ, so
φÑ ϕ ϕÑ φ
^I.
φØ ϕ
Conversely, if $ φ Ø ϕ, we find by ^E1 and ^E2 that $ φ Ñ ϕ and $ ϕ Ñ φ. Part 1.
completes our proof.
4.2 Soundness and Completeness with Ordinary Classical
Propositional Logic
Definition 4.2.1. The Ordinary Propositional Language denoted LO is defined as
follows
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1. The class Atom. contains an element pi, called a Propositional Variable, for each
i ¥ 1.
2. The connectives in LO include the constants K,J, the unary connective  , and the
binary connectives Ñ,^,_.
Ordinary classical propositional logic LCO shall be defined as the logic under the
language LO with all the inference maps Definition 4.1.2. 4
Lemma 4.2.2.
1.  φ %$ φÑK,
2. φ_ ϕ %$  φÑ ϕ,
3. φ^ ϕ %$  p φ_ ϕq,
4. J %$  K,
5. φØ ϕ %$ pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq
Proof. Note that Corollary 4.1.7 holds in LCO since it contains the same rules, so to
prove anything of the form ϕ %$ φ, it shall suffice to prove $ ϕØ φ.
1.
rφs1 r φs2
 E,
K
Ñ I1
φÑK
Ñ I2
 φÑ pφÑKq
rφs3 rφÑKs4
Ñ E
K
 I3
 φ
Ñ I4
pφÑKq Ñ  φ
Ø I.
 φØ pφÑKq
2.
φ_ ϕ
rφs3 r φs1
Ñ I1
 φÑ ϕ
rϕs3
Ñ I2
 φÑ ϕ
_E3,
 φÑ ϕ
so we find that φ_ ϕ $  φÑ ϕ.
LEM
φ_ φ
rφs1
_I1
φ_ ϕ
r φs1  φÑ ϕ
Ñ E
ϕ
_I2
φ_ ϕ
_E1,
φ_ ϕ
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so we find that  φÑ ϕ $ φ_ ϕ.
3.
r φ_ ϕs2
r φs1
rφ^ ϕs3
^E1
φ
 E
K
r ϕs1
φ^ ϕ
^E2
ϕ
 E
K
_E3
K
 I2
 p φ_ ϕq
so φ^ ϕ $  p φ_ ϕq.
LEM
φ_ φ
rφs2 rϕs1
^I
φ^ ϕ r pφ^ ϕqs3
 E
K
 I1
 ϕ
_I2
 φ_ ϕ
r φs2
_I1
 φ_ ϕ
 E
K
 I3,
φ^ ϕ
so  p φ_ ϕq $ φ^ ϕ.
4.
J
J
Ñ I1
 KÑ J
rKs2
Ñ I3
J Ñ  K
Ø I,
J Ø  K
5.
φØ ϕ
Ø E1
φÑ ϕ
φØ ϕ
^I,
pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq
so φØ ϕ $ pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq.
pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq
^E1
φÑ ϕ
pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq
^E2
ϕÑ φ
Ø I,
φØ ϕ
so pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq $ φØ ϕ.
Theorem 4.2.3. LC is deduction class equivalent with LCO.
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Proof. Let hV : LO Ñ LC be a function defined by
hV pφq 
$''''''&
''''''%
φ, if φ is atomic, or φ : φ1 Ñ φ2, or φ :K,
hV pφ
1q ÑK, if φ :  φ1,
KÑK, if φ : J,
hV p φ1q Ñ hV pφ2q, if φ : φ1 _ φ2,
hV p p φ1 _ φ2qq, if φ : φ1 ^ φ2.
We can then extend the function HV : ObpCpLCOqq Ñ ObpCpLCqq to HV pΓq 
xhV ppi1pΓqq, . . . , hV ppi|Γ|pΓqqy. Notice that Lemma 4.2.2 implies that formula vectors in
LCO are logically equivalent to some formula vector in LC . Then since HV pΓq B C B Γ
and hV p∆q C B∆, we find for every edge p∆,Γ, iq in LCO, we get HpΓq B Hp∆q. But
since HpΓq, Hp∆q are also objects in CpLCq and all inference maps in LCO are deriv-
able in LC , we find HpΓq " Hp∆q. Then choose arrows HpΓq
fe
ÞÑ Hp∆q in CpLCq, for
each edge e  pΓ,∆, iq, and define HE : GpLCOqpEq Ñ ArpCpLCqq. We find H : GpLCOq
Ñ CpLCq form a graph homomorphism. Note that it is surjective on vertices.
Then there exists a cartesian functorH : GpLCOq Ñ GpLCqq. DefineH : ArpGpLCOq{ !"
q Ñ ArpGpLCq{CBqq by Hprf sq  rHpfqs. It is easy to verify that this is a well-defined
functor. Moreover, since rΓs  r∆s implies HOb.prΓsq  HOb.pr∆sq, we find H is injective
on vertices, as well as surjective, which completes our proof.
4.3 Classical Semantics
In this section shall quickly define a classical valuation logic that turns out to be the
one desired that is complete with LC , and derive a few of its essential properties.
Definition 4.3.1. Let φ, ϕ be LC-formulas. A mapping v : Prop Ñ t0, 1u is a classical
valuation, and part of the valuation class V alC if
1. vpKq  0,
2. vpφÑ ϕq  1 if and ony if vpφq  0 or vpϕq  1.
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The logic LV C on LC generated (using Definition 4.6.1) by the class V alC of classical
valuation mappings shall be called the classical propositional valuation logic. 4
First, this lemma will derive a very important tool for constructing valuation maps.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let w : Atom. Ñ t0, 1u be a function. Then there exists a unique extension
v : Prop. Ñ t0, 1u that is a classic valuation mapping.
Proof. For existence, define v : Prop. Ñ t0, 1u by
vpφq 
$'&
'%
wpφq, if φ is Atomic,
0, if φ :K,
maxt1 vpφ1q, vpφ2qu, if φ : φ1 Ñ φ2.
It follows by straightforward structural induction on L that v is well-defined. It follows by
definition that v is a valuation mapping. And it finally follows by the same straightforward
structural induction on L that v is unique.
As it turns out, these two conditions in Definition 4.3.1 are enough to derive the
sufficient conditions that hold on valuation maps for  ,_,^,J, and Ø.
Proposition 4.3.3. Let φ, ϕ be LC-formulas. Let Γ be a LC-vector. Then
1. vp φq  1 if and only if vpφq  0,
2. vpφ_ ϕq  maxtvpφq, vpϕqu,
3. vpφ^ ϕq  mintvpφq, vpϕqu,
4. vpJq  1,
5. vpφØ ϕq  1 if and only if vpφq  vpϕq.
for all valuations v : Prop Ñ t0, 1u.
Proof. 1. Our conclusion follows directly from the fact that  φ : φÑK.
2. Note that φ _ ϕ :  φ Ñ ϕ. If vpφq  1, then vp φq  0, hence vpφ _ ϕq  1. If
vpϕq  1, then vpφ _ ϕq  1. If vpφq  vpϕq  0, then we find vp φq  1 and vpϕq  0,
hence vpφ_ ϕq  0.
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3. Note that φ^ϕ :  p φ_ ϕq. If vpφq  0 or vpϕq  0, then vp φq  1 or vp ϕq  1.
It follows by part 2 of this proposition that if vpφq  0 or vpϕq  0, then vp φ_ ϕq  1,
hence vpφ^ ϕq  0.
4. Follows directly from part 1 of this proposition.
5. Note that φ Ø ϕ : pφ Ñ ϕq ^ pϕ Ñ φq. We find vpφ Ø ϕq  1 ðñ vpφ Ñ ϕq 
vpϕÑ φq  1. Suppose vpφq  vpϕq. In both the case that vpφq  0 and vpφq  1, we get
vpφÑ ϕq  vpϕÑ φq  1.
Conversely, suppose vpφØ ϕq  1. We have two cases.
Q1. Suppose vpφq  0. Then vpϕÑ φq  vpφÑ ϕq  1. It must be that vpϕq  0.
Q2. Suppose vpφq  1. By similar argument, we get vpϕq  1.
With the next proposition, it shall be shown that finding ( φÑ ϕ is equivalent to finding
that φ ( ϕ, and then the analogous principle for ( φ Ø ϕ and φ )( ϕ, similar to what
was found in the last section with $ and LC .
Proposition 4.3.4. Let φ, ϕ be LC-formulas, let Γ be LC-formulas.
1. xφ, ϕy )( φ^ ϕ,
2. φ ( ϕ if and only if ( φÑ ϕ,
3. φ )( ϕ if and only if ( φØ ϕ,
4. K( φ,
5. If xΓ, φy ( ϕ, then Γ ( φÑ ϕ,
6. xφ, φÑ ϕy ( ϕ,
7. If xΓ, φ1y ( ϕ and xΓ, φ2y ( ϕ then xΓ, φ1 _ φ2y ( ϕ.
Proof.
1. Note that Proposition 4.3.3 tells us vpφq  vpϕq  1 ðñ vpφ^ ϕq  1.
2. Suppose φ ( ϕ. Then vpφq  0 ùñ vpφ Ñ ϕq  1 and vpφq  1 ùñ vpϕq  1 ùñ
vpφÑ ϕq  1.
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Conversely, suppose ( φÑ ϕ. By hypothesis, we find vpφÑ ϕq Ñ vpφq  0 or vpϕq  1.
Then given vpφq  1, we have vpϕq  1.
3. Suppose φ )( ϕ. Then by part 3, we have ( φ Ñ ϕ and ( ϕ Ñ φ. Then since
φØ ϕ : pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq, so vpφØ ϕq  mintvpφÑ ϕq, vpϕÑ φqu  1.
Conversely, suppose ( φ Ø ϕ. By part 2, we have ( xφ Ñ ϕ,ϕ Ñ φy. Our conclusion
then follows by part 3.
4. Trivial.
5. Follows directly from part 2.
6. Suppose v is a valuation mapping that satisfies xφ, φÑ ϕy. It follows from vpφÑ ϕq  1
that either vpφq  0 or vpϕq  1. Since vpφq  1, our conclusion is satisfied.
7. Suppose v is a valuation mapping that satisfies xΓ, φ1_φ2y ( ϕ. Then vmaxtvpφ1q, vpφ2qu 
vpφ1_φ2q  1. This gives us two similar cases, either of which satisfy xΓ, φ1y and xΓ, φ2y.
Either way, our conclusion follows.
4.4 Classical Completeness and Consequences
This is the much awaited section where we show that LC is sound and complete on
LV C , which is alas no trivial matter thanks to the puzzle of completeness. The problem
is the valuation inference map V in LV C does not keep very good track of the inference
process of LC . While it may be that LV C is regarded as a logic in this paper, one must
remember that LV C is nevertheless not crafted to be deductively powerful when it comes
to a sequential inference process. Rather, it “verifies truth” based on valuation maps in a
one-step process that would take LC an arbitrarily large finite number of steps.
So what should be done about this? The one reasonable thing there is to do: Use LV C
for its strength and not its weakness. LV C is very good at analyzing “truth” given a
valuation, so why not try to come up with a sufficient condition for completeness that
involves coming up with a specific valuation. On that note, it seems more natural to prove
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completeness contrapositively, which is to say, proving Γ & ∆ ùñ Γ * ∆. Now given
a pretty manageable hypothesis, all that has to be done is prove there exists a valuation
mapping such that vpφq  0, for some φ ¨ ∆. That doesn’t look so bad!
It especially looks manageable when one sees that the deductive system is surprisingly
very good at building bigger vectors from smaller ones that conserve a given property, and
eventually from a recursive collection of consistent vectors one can make valuation mapping
out of them. Actually, the standard proof for completeness in a standard treatment of first
order propositional logic involves creating a “maximal consistent set” that contains Γ.
Unfortunately, that can’t be done with vectors since vectors are finite, and all the things
one could add to Γ that would keep it consistent is infinite. However, the method can
still be captured by creating a recursive sequence of consistent vectors ∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆n, . . .
with ∆0  Γ and for each n  1, go through FormC in an enumeration φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, . . .
(since there are countably many!), and if it’s consistent, set ∆n 1 equal to x∆n, φn 1y;
otherwise, keep ∆n 1 the same as ∆n. Actually, a similar idea in the standard treatment
is used to show a maximal consistent set exists in the first place, but why not just make
a valuation mapping out of it?
Lemma 4.4.1. Suppose Γ & φ, for some LC-formula φ. Enumerate all propositions in
LC φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, . . .. For each n ¥ 0, define a LC vector recursively as follows
∆n 
$'&
'%
Γ, if n  0,
x∆n1, φny, if x∆n1, φny & φ,
x∆n1, φny otherwise.
Define a function v : Prop Ñ t0, 1u as follows
vpφq 
#
1, if φ ¨ ∆n, for some n ¥ 0,
0, otherwise.
Then v is a classical valuation mapping.
Proof. We shall first prove the following claims.
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Claim 1. If Γ & φ and Γ $ ϕ, then xΓ, ϕy & φ.
If xΓ, ϕy $ φ, it follows that Γ $ xΓ, ϕy and xΓ, ϕy $ φ, so we would have Γ $ φ, which
cannot happen.
Claim 2. If ∆n1 $ ϕ, for some n1 ¥ 0, then there exists some n2 ¥ 0 such that ϕ ¨ ∆n2.
Suppose ∆n1 $ ϕ, for some n1 ¥ 0. Then by Claim 1, we find p∆n1 , ϕq & φ. Note that
ϕ : φn2 , for some n2 ¥ 1. We have two cases.
W1. Suppose n2 ¤ n1. Since x∆n21, ϕy ¨ x∆n1 , ϕy, we find x∆n21, ϕy  x∆n21, φn2y &
φ. It follows that ϕ ¨ x∆n21, φn2y  ∆n2 .
W2. Suppose n2 ¡ n1. Then n2  1 ¥ n1. Then since ∆n1 ¨ ∆n21, we have ∆n21 $ ϕ.
It follows by Claim 1 that x∆n21, ϕy & φ, hence ϕ ¨ x∆n21, φn2y  ∆n2 .
Now we shall prove the lemma. Define a function v : Prop Ñ t0, 1u as follows.
vpφq 
#
1, if φ ¨ ∆n, for some n ¥ 0,
0, otherwise.
We shall prove that this is indeed a valuation mapping in V alC . Since x∆n,Ky $ φ, for
all n ¥ 0, we find vpKq  0. We shall spend the remainder of this proof showing that
vpϕ1 Ñ ϕ2q  1 ðñ vpϕ1q  0 or vpϕ2q  1.
Suppose vpϕ1 Ñ ϕ2q  1. Then ϕ1 Ñ ϕ2 ¨ ∆n1 , for some n1 ¥ 0. It shall suffice
to prove that vpϕ1q  0 ùñ vpϕ2q  1. Suppose vpϕ1q  0. Then ϕ1 ¨ ∆n2 , for
some n2 ¥ 0. It shall suffice to prove ϕ2 ¨ ∆n3 , for some n3 ¥ 0. Note that since
xϕ1, ϕ1 Ñ ϕ2y ¨ ∆maxtn1,n2u, we find ∆maxtn1,n2u $ ϕ2 by Ñ E. Then our conclusion
follows by Claim 2.
For the converse, it shall suffice by Claim 2 to prove that ∆m $ ϕ1 Ñ ϕ2, for some m ¥ 0.
We have two cases.
R1. Suppose vpϕ1q  0. Note that ϕ1 : φm, for some m ¥ 1. We find φm ª ∆m. Then
x∆m1, φmy $ φ, so ∆m  x∆m1, φmy. It follows from _I1 that ∆m $ ϕ1 Ñ ϕ2.
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R2. Suppose vpϕq  1. Then ϕ ¨ ∆m, for some m ¥ 1. We find ∆m $ ϕ1 Ñ ϕ2 by
Ñ I.
Theorem 4.4.2. LC is sound and complete on LV C .
Proof. For soundness, Proposition 4.3.4 confirms that every inference map is derivable
in LV C .
For completeness, suppose Γ & ∆. Then Γ & φ for some φ : piqp∆q, for some 1 ¤ q ¤ |∆|.
Using Lemma 4.4.1, we get a valuation mapping v such that vppikpΓqq  1 but vpφq  0,
hence Γ * ∆.
Corollary 4.4.3. Let Γ,∆ by LC-formula vectors. If Γ * ∆, then Γ & ∆.
Corollary 4.4.4. V ars is consistent (and hence so is LC). Every atomic variable, and
its negation, is underivable.
Proposition 4.4.5. Let φ, ϕ be LC-formulas, let Γ be LC-formulas.
1. φ_ ϕ & φÑ  ϕ and φ_ ϕ & ϕÑ  φ,
2. φÑ ϕ & ϕÑ φ,
3. φÑ ϕ &  φÑ  ϕ.
5
Sequent Calculus
Now this chapter gets to a rather different way of doing logic, which is sequent calculus.
It is a very exotic system and much more difficult/counterintuitive to work with, but the
system is overall a better way of doing deductions, since one can look at more than one
propositions and one does not have the awkward mechanic of hypothesizing. Additionally,
it lays out a straightforward system of doing logic on a collection of propositions as opposed
to ordingary “natural deduction”, which is really only good for deriving single propositions.
The first section will be about constructing the language on which inferences are made.
It turns out to be sufficient in the context of the deductive category to do deductions
not directly on the propositional language but rather on a metalanguage for reasons that
will be discussed in that section. The second section defines intuitionistic sequent calculus
in an analogous way to chapter 5, where only three connectives Ñ,K,^ are used and
the rest of the connectives, and inference maps with them, are derived. The third section
shall be devoted to the cut rule, and proving the surprising result that it can be derived
from the other inference maps. The fourth section derives some important properties of
intuitionistic sequent calculus that gives an idea as to what the system really means in
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the context of propositional logic. Finally, the fifth section shows an easy semantic view
of sequent calculus that is complete, and moreover that intuitionistic sequent calculus is
sound and complete with intuitionistic propositional calculus.
5.1 The Metalanguage and Sequents
With the way sequent calculus is presented, it calls for a new order of language since the
formal deductive system of logic that has been derived in this paper does inferences directly
on a language, and the objects which Gentzen style inference operates on are different
than typical propositions, and for that matter lists of them. This world of inference rather
operates on metalinguistic relations of Γ $ ∆. So in order for the definitions of deduction
to carry over in this instance, it is imperitive that this “metalinguistic” format be defined
as a formal language itself. The definition below does exactly that.
Definition 5.1.1. Given a language L, a Sequent Metalanguage M is a language with
a single binary relation symbol $. To represent a M-formula, we shall write pΓ $ ∆q for
any two L-vectors Γ and ∆. The terms in the language, i.e. the L-vectors, shall be referred
to as the Sequents. 4
Remark 5.1.2. Although it is standard to write “Γ $ ∆” in most sequent calculus text
to essentially say “∆ is derivable by Γ”, we shall forgo standard notation in the name
of “good syntax”. Instead we write “pΓ $ ∆q” to denote the specific M-formula that
our definition represents. To talk about derivability in M, we shall continue with our
common practice in Chapter 3 and write A " B, where A and B are M-vectors, that is
to say A  xpΓ1 $ ∆1q, . . . , pΓn $ ∆nqy and B  xpΦ1 $ Ψ1q, . . . , pΦm $ Ψmqy, where
Γi,∆i,Φi,Ψi are sequents for every i. ♦
One thing that will be important later down the road of sequent calculus is a notion
of interchangeability of a propositional symbol, because although the logical deduction is
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really done on the metalanguage, one is really interested in how the propositions inter-
relate to each other. The notion of propositional equivalance in sequent calculus then is
interchangeability where given the sequent Γ1, θ,Γ2, one can substitute θ for θ
1 and vice
versa. The exact definition is provided below.
Definition 5.1.3. In a sequent metalanguage M, if a two formula θ, ϕ are such that
pΓ $ ∆1, θ,∆2q !" pΓ $ ∆1, ϕ,∆2q and pΦ1, θ,Φ2 $ Ψq !" pΦ1, ϕ,Φ2 $ Ψq, for every
sequent Γ,∆1,∆2,Φ1,Φ2,Ψ, then we shall call θ is interchangeable with ϕ. Define the
binary relation m on Form such that θ m ϕ if and only if θ is interchangeable with ϕ. 4
5.2 Intuitionistic Sequent Logic Definition
This section will be about sequent calculus of the intuitionistic variety, using the in-
tuitionistic language defined in Chapter 5. Remember that this language uses only the
Ñ,K,^ connectives in order to again keep the axioms at a minimum, as shall be defined
here
Definition 5.2.1. The Intuitionistic Propositional Language denoted LI is defined
as follows
1. The class Atom. contains an element pi, called a Propositional Variable, for each
i ¥ 1.
2. The connectives in LI include the constant K and the binary connectives Ñ,^.
Furthermore, we shall further define the connectives  ,_,^,Ø,J as shorthand notation
for the following:
1.  φ : φÑK
2. φ_ ϕ :    φÑ ϕ,
3. φØ ϕ : pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq,
4. J :  K. 4
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Remark 5.2.2. While everything seems eloquent with having intuitionistic logic defined
in terms of three connectives, it is not 100 % certain that doing so is possible without not
catching the full scope of intutionistic logic. It is the writer’s opinion, and a lot of research
that unfortunately did not make it to this paper, that suggests that indeed it does. So
it will be an assumption that will be made, alas. For a standard inquiry on intuitionistic
logic in general, Chapter 5 of Van Dalen’s introductory logic text is a great resource for
the basics. [3] To absorb what is going on with Getzen Calculus, an adequate resource for
that is Girard’s Proofs and Types. [5] ♦
The rest of this section is devoted to deriving the rest of the more practical and versatile
inference maps to work with when it comes to doing these proofs in a more efficient manner,
as well as the missing inference rules for connectives  ,_,J.
Definition 5.2.3. Let θ, ϕ be propositional variables and Γ,∆,Φ,Ψ be sequents. Intu-
itionistic Sequent Calculus LS is a logic with the propositional sequent metalanguage
with the following rules of inference.
1. Identity
I
pθ $ θq
2. Exchange
pΓ, θ, ϕ,Φ $ ∆q LX
pΓ, ϕ, θ,Φ $ ∆q
pΓ,$ Ψ, θ, ϕ,∆q RX
pΓ,$ Ψ, ϕ, θ,∆q
3. Weakening
pΓ $ ∆q LW
pΓ, θ $ ∆q
pΓ $ ∆q RW
pΓ $ θ,∆q
4. Contraction
pΓ, θ, θ $ ∆q LC
pΓ, θ $ ∆q
pΓ $ θ, θ,∆q RC
pΓ $ θ,∆q
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5. Impication
pΓ $ θ,∆q pΦ, ϕ $ Ψq LÑ
pΓ,Φ, θ Ñ ϕ $ ∆,Ψq
pΓ, θ $ ϕ,∆q RÑ
pΓ $ θ Ñ ϕ,∆q
6. Falsum
K
pK$ q
7. Conjunction
pΓ, θ $ ∆q L1^
pΓ, θ ^ ϕ $ ∆q
p∆, ϕ $ ∆q L2^
pΓ, θ ^ ϕ $ ∆q
pΓ $ θ,∆q pΦ $ ϕ,Ψq R^
pΓ,Φ $ θ ^ ϕ,∆,Ψq
4
Definition 5.2.4. Important Inference maps to be aware of (that shall be show later in
this section can be derived from LS as they are defined) are as follows
1. Cut
pΓ $ θ,∆q pΦ, θ $ Ψq
Cut,
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
2. Negation
pΓ, θ $ ∆q L 
pΓ $  θ,∆q
pΓ $ θ,∆q R 
pΓ, θ $ ∆q
3. Top
J
p $ Jq
4. Disjunction
pΓ, θ $ ∆q p∆, ϕ $ Ψq L_
pΓ,Φ, θ _ ϕ $ ∆,Ψq
pΓ $ θ,∆q R1_
pΓ $ θ _ ϕ,∆q
pΓ $ ϕ,∆q R2_
pΓ $ θ _ ϕ,∆q
4
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What makes derivations in this language rather tedious first of all is the fact that the
exchange rule does not explicitly allow one to rearrange sequents in any order all in one
step. However, given that the exchange rule allows simply for one two switch the position
of two terms in the sequent, one can derive the fact that seqents can be rearranged in
any order corresponding to any permutation, as this next proposition shows. A basic
understanding of permutations is in order from then on, since arbitrary permutations will
be placed on sequents a lot to signify that the order does not matter. It should also be noted
that the permutations placed on sequents from then on will be done rather informally, as
in the exact logistics of the domain and codomain of the permutation will be implied
from the fact that a permutation σ (the often-used permutation letter of choice) is being
operated specifically on an arbitrary sequent ∆ to get a rearranged sequent σp∆q.
Note that a lot of work will be done with permutations from here on out and somewhat
of a background in algebra is assumed. For more information on the basics, however,
looking through section 1.3 Dummit and Foote’s Algebra text is recommended. [4]
Proposition 5.2.5. Let Γ,∆ be vectors in LI-vectors. Let σ be a permutation. Then the
inference maps:
pΓ $ ∆q LX 
pσpΓq $ ∆q
pΓ $ ∆q RX 
pΓ $ σp∆qq
are derivable in LS.
Proof. For a given permutation σ, note that it can be expressed as a finite number of
transpositions τ1τ2 . . . τn for n ¥ 1. If LX  applies to any transposition, than we can
apply LX  any finite number of times for τi, for each 1 ¤ i ¤ n, to get LX , for any
permutation σ  τ1τ2 . . . τn. It shall suffice to prove LX  applies to transpositions, and
let R  follow from similarity.
Let τ be a transposition. We can express any permutation τ 1 as pj, kq, where j  k and
1 ¤ j, k ¤ |Γ|, and τppiipΓqq  pijpΓq and τppijpΓqq  piipΓq. Let a, b ¥ 1 such that
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τ  pa, bq. Without loss of generality, suppose a   b. Then we find τ  pa, a 1qpa 1, a 
2q . . . pa  pb a 1q, bq. For each 1 ¤ r ¤ b a, we find
pa  r  1, a  rqpφ1, . . . , φnq : φ1, . . . , φa r2, φa r, φa r1, φa r 1, . . . , φn,
for any order n ¥ b  a sequent φ1, . . . , φn. It follows that for each Φ : φ1, . . . , φn and
1 ¤ r ¤ b a, we get
pΦ $ Ψq LX.
ppa  r  1, a  rqpΦq $ Ψq
Our conclusion then follows by repeated use of LX on each pa  r 1, a  rq on the result
after it, for each 1 ¤ r ¤ b a.
Essentially, one has shown that the order of sequents are invariant, which is to say that
a sequent ∆ and σp∆q for any permutation σ are logically equivalent. This result shall be
reflected in the next corollary which allows one to be very liberal with the order at which
connective operations are applied.
Corollary 5.2.6. The following inference maps are derivable in LS. Let σ1, σ2, σ3 be
permutations
1.
pΓ $ ∆q LGW
pσ1pΓ, θq $ ∆q
pΓ $ ∆q RGW
pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq
2.
pσ1pΓ, θ, θq $ ∆q LGC
pσ2pΓ, θq $ ∆q
pΓ $ σ1pθ, θ,∆qq RGC
pΓ $ σ2pθ,∆qq
3.
pΓ $ σ1p∆, θqq pσ2pΦ, ϕq $ Ψq LGÑ
pσ3pΓ,Φ, θ Ñ ϕq $ ∆,Ψq
pσ1pΓ, θq $ σ2pϕ,∆qq RGÑ
pΓ $ σ3pθ Ñ ϕ,∆qq
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4.
pσ1pΓ, θq $ ∆q LG1^
pσ1pΓ, θ ^ ϕq $ ∆q
pσ1pΓ, ϕq $ ∆q LG2^
pσ1pΓ, θ ^ ϕq $ ∆q
pΓ $ σ1p∆, θqq pΦ $ σ2pϕ,Ψqq RG^
pΓ,Φ $ σ3pθ ^ ϕ,∆,Ψqq
Proof. The main insight here is that for every permutation σ, there exists an inverse
permutation σ1 such that σ1σ  σσ1  id.
Yet another way one can generalize inference maps is not just through repeated use of
exchange, but also repeated use of weakening and contraction. The generalized inference
rules that result from this observation are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2.7. Let σ be a permutation. The inference rules
1.
pΓ $ ∆q LGW 
pσpΓ,Θq $ ∆q
pΓ $ ∆q RGW 
pΓ $ σpΘ,∆qq
2.
pσpΦ,Γ,Γq $ ∆q LGC 
pΦ,Γ $ ∆q
pΓ $ σp∆,∆,Ψqq RGC 
pΓ $ ∆,Ψq
3.
K  
pK$ Θq
are derivable in LS.
Proof.
1. LGW  and RGW  follow from repeated use of LW and RW respectively, followed
by LX  and RX  respectively.
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2. LGC  and RGC  follow from repeated use of LC and RC respectively, followed by
LX  and RX  respectively.
3. Follows directly from RW .
This brings light to a new insight, which is that intuitionistic sequent calculus the way
that it is presented in the initial definition is a sound and completete system of logic that
starts with these generalized rules. This will be very useful when doing proofs by structural
induction, which will hapen very soon.
Corollary 5.2.8. Let LGS be a logic with the language as the sequent metalanguage MLI
of LI and the inference rules I, LX , RX , LGW , RGW , LGC, RGC, LGÑ, RGÑ,
K, LG^, and RG^. LGS is a complete logic to LS.
Now is the point where further theoretical insight takes some very advanced machinery,
which turns out to be the Cut rule. Most texts utilize the Cut rule as an axiom to sequent
calculus since it is essential to deriving theorems in any sort of reasonable way. However,
it is a rather surprising result that actually applied to all provable sequent formulas in
sequent calculus, one can derive Cut from simply the other axiomized maps in intuitionistic
sequent calculus. What the rule is exactly is provided in the definition, however there is a
more general version GCut that in sequent calculus is logically equivalent to Cut, which
for practical purposes is not only better to use but actually easier to prove.
Theorem 5.2.9. the inference map
pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut,
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
for permutations σ1, σ2 is derivable in intuitionistic propositional calculus.
Since the proof of this theorem is a rather involved laborious process that takes sophisti-
cated structural inductive techniques and a lot of cases, this proof shall be put off until the
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very next section–one that is entirely devoted to the Cut map and the proof to deriving
it.
This final proposition does the job of deriving the inferece maps for the other con-
nectives. Given the definition of these other connectives in terms of the three Ñ,K,^, it
terms out that one can derive all the others, which is definitely a good pitstop result to
be in to untimately figure out that LS is sound and complete with LI .
Proposition 5.2.10. L , R , J, L_, R1_, R2_ are derivable in LS.
Proof. L 
pΓ $ θ,∆q
I
pθ $ θq
K
pK$ q LÑ
pθ, θ $ q
GCut.
pΓ, θ $ ∆q
R 
I
pθ $ θq RW
pθ $K, θ RÑ
p $  θ, θq pΓ, θ $ ∆q
GCut.
pΓ $  θ,∆q
J Using R , we get
K
pK$ q R .
p $ Jq
L_ Using L , we get
Γ, θ $ ∆ R 
Γ $  θ,∆ L 
Γ,  θ $,∆ R 
Γ $    θ,∆ Φ, ϕ $ Ψ LÑ .
Γ, φ_ ϕ,Φ $ ∆,Ψ
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R1_
Γ $ θ,∆ RGW
Γ $ θ, ϕ,∆ L 
Γ, θ $ ϕ,∆ R 
Γ $   θ, ϕ,∆ L 
Γ,   θ $ ϕ,∆ RÑ .
Γ $ θ _ ϕ,∆
R2_ Similar to R1_.
5.3 The Cut Rule
When one first hears the result that the Cut rule is derivable in LS , it is easy to
think that this is an absurd notion that is easy to find some sort of counterexample. After
all, no rule takes a proposition and eliminates them, except for the very specific case of
the contraction rule. But the Cut rule really happens as a result of atomically derivable
formulas being limited to only pθ $ θq and pK$ q, and it just happening that from the
structurally inductive ground up, given that one can prove Γ $ θ,∆ and Φ, θ $ Ψ, one
can always find a way to prove Γ,Φ $ ∆,Ψ using the original inference map axioms of
LS .
As stated before this theorem really seeks to prove a more general result GCut, which
is a more general and easier to prove result because it gives a more powerful inductive
hypothesis to work with (that one gets for free from the base case), and proving GCut
involves structural induction on the left formula. Where it gets tricky, however, is when
one is to prove that GCut works for θ : ϕ1 Ñ ϕ2 or θ : ϕ1^ϕ2 with no straightforward
way to backtrack and cut eliminate ϕ1 and ϕ2 since the right side has not been broken
down. What then is in order is when proving specifically R Ñ and L^ is doing such by
structural induction on the right hand formula.
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Thankfully, this proof is made a little similar by the fact that there are a lot of similar
cases, and also by the idea of doing structural induction on LGS instead of LS because
remember those two systems are sound and complete on each other. Now the rest of this
section will be the theorem restated again and its proof.
Theorem 5.3.1. the inference map
pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut,
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
for permutations σ1, σ2 is derivable in intuitionistic propositional calculus.
Proof. It shall suffice to prove our result on the logic LGS in Corollary 6.2.6, since
it is sound with LS . Let pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq and pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq be M-formulae. We shall
proceed by structural induction on by LGS . We shall prove GCut by structural induction
on pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq based on all derivable formulae. For our atomic case, we have two cases.
I Suppose pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pθ $ θq
K Since |σ1pθ,∆qq| ¥ 1, we cannot have pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pK$ q. We are done.
For the inductive step, given n ¥ 1, suppose "n 1 pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq and we can apply Gcut
with pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq to all order n derivable MLI -formula. We have ten cases.
LX  Suppose pΓ $ pσ1pθ,∆qq : σ1pΓ1q $ σ1pθ,∆q and "n Γ1 $ σ1pθ,∆q, where σ1 is a
permutation. We have
pΓ1 $ σ1pθ,∆qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ1,Φ $ ∆,Ψq LX   .
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
RX  Suppose pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq and "n pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq, where σ1 is a
permutation. We have
pΓ1 $ σ1pθ,∆qqq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ,Φ $ ∆1,Ψq RX   .
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
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LGW Suppose pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : σ1pΓ1, γq $ σ1pθ,∆q and "n pΓ1 $ σ1pθ,∆qq, where σ1 is
a permutation. We have
pΓ1 $ σ1pθ,∆qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ1,Φ $ ∆,Ψq RGW.
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
RGW Suppose pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pΓ $ σ1pϕ,∆1qq and "n pΓ $ ∆1q, where σ1 is a
permutation. If ϕ is not θ, we find ∆1 : σ2pθ,∆2q, for some sequent ∆2 and permutation
σ2, and we have
pΓ $ ∆1q pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ,Φ $ ∆2,Ψq LGW.
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
Otherwise, if ϕ : θ, we find ∆ : σ2p∆1q, for some permutation σ2, and we have
pΓ $ ∆1q LW
pΓ,Φ $ ∆1q RGW.
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
LGC Suppose pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pσ1pΓ1, γ, γq $ σ1pθ,∆qq and "n σ2pΓ1, γq $ σ1pθ,∆q,
where σ1 and σ2 are permutations. We find
pσ1pΓ1, γ, γq $ σ1pθ,∆qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ1, γ, γ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq LGC.
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
RGC Suppose pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pΓ $ σ1pϕ,ϕ,∆qq and "n Γ $ σ2pϕ,∆1q, where σ1 and
σ2 are permutations. If ϕ is not θ, we find ∆1 : σ3pθ,∆2q, for some sequent ∆2 and
permutation σ3, and we have
pΓ $ σ2pϕ,ϕ,∆1qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ,Φ $ ϕ,ϕ,∆2,Ψq RGC.
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
Suppose ϕ : θ. Throughout the proof, we have actually proven a more general hypothesis
that follows directly from our current hypothesis; this is only just the first instance where
I use it (hence I bring it up now, since you have the motivation). This hypothesis is: GCut
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may be applied with pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq and the result pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq after using GCut on
pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq (should any θ exist in Γ,Φ). This certainly occurs in our base case since
in the I case pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq : pθ $ θq, which is just pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq again, and in the K
case we cannot satisfy our given hypothesis. In our inductive step (in every case), this just
follows simply through deriving pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq entirely through inductively hypothesized
formulas and inference maps that we woud then have established to be closed under our
inductive step (so proving the more general hypothesis would follow from similarity of
proving the less general one).
We find that
pΓ $ σ2pϕ,ϕ,∆1qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ,Φ $ θ,∆1,Ψq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut.
pΓ,Φ,Φ $ ∆,Ψ,Ψq LGC 
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψ,Ψq RGC 
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
LG Ñ Suppose ϕ : ϕ1 Ñ ϕ2 and pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pσ1pΓ1,Γ2, ϕq $ σ1pθ,∆1,∆2qq and
"n ppΓ1 $ σ
1pϕ1, θ,∆1qq, pσ
2pΓ2, ϕ1q $ ∆2qq, where σ
1 and σ2 are permutations. We find
that
pΓ1 $ σ
1pϕ1, θ,∆1qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ1,Φ $ ϕ1,∆1,Ψq pσ
2pΓ2, ϕ2q $ ∆2q LGÑ .
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
RGÑ Suppose ϕ : ϕ1 Ñ ϕ2 and pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pΓ $ σ1pϕ,∆1qq and "n pσ2pΓ, ϕ1q $
σ3pϕ2,∆
1qq, where σ1, σ2, σ3 are permutations. If ϕ is not θ, then ∆1 : σM p∆
2, θq, for
some permutation σM , so we have
pσ2pΓ, ϕ1q $ σ
3pϕ2,∆
1qq pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ, ϕ1,Φ $ ϕ2,∆
2,Ψq RÑ .
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
Now suppose ϕ : θ. We shall proceed by structural induction on pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq (in other
words the right side). Note that the subcasesRGÑ: I,RGÑ:K work similarly to our base
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cases done earlier. For the inductive step, we find RGÑ: LX, RGÑ: RX, RGÑ: LGW ,
RG Ñ: RGW , RG Ñ: LGC, RG Ñ: RGC follows similarly to our previous cases. The
remaining subcases include RGÑ: LGÑ, RGÑ: RGÑ, RGÑ: LG^, RGÑ: LG^.
RGÑ: LGÑ Suppose $ : $1 Ñ $2 and pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq : pσpΦ1,Φ2, $q $ Ψ1,Ψ2q and
"n ppΦ1 $ σ
p$1,Ψ1qq, pσ
pΦ2, $2q $ Ψ2qq, where σ
, σ, σ are permutations. If $
is not θ, then we are left with a case similar to LGÑ when ϕ was not θ. Suppose $ : θ.
Then $1 : ϕ1 and $2 : ϕ2. We find
pσ2pΓ, ϕ1q $ σ
3pϕ2,∆
1qq ppΦ1 $ σ
p$1,Ψ1qq
GCut
pΓ,Φ1 $ σ
3pϕ2,∆
1q,Ψ1q pσ
pΦ2, $2q $ Ψ2q
GCut.
Γ,Φ $ ∆,Ψ
RG Ñ: RG Ñ Suppose $ : $1 Ñ $2 and pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq : pσ2pΦ, θq $ σp$,Ψ1qq and
"n pσ
pΦ, θ, $1q $ σ
p$2,Ψ
1qq, where σ, σ, σ are permutations. Then
pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq pσ
pΦ, θ, $1q $ σ
p$2,Ψ
1qq
GCut
pΓ,Φ, $1 $ ∆, $2,Ψ
1q RGÑ .
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
RG Ñ: LG ^ 1 Suppose $ : $1 ^ $2 and pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq : pσ2pΦ1, $, θq $ Ψ and
"n pσ
pΦ1, $1, θq $ Ψ, where σ
 is a permutation. Then
pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq pσ
pΦ1, $1, θq $ Ψq
Gcut
pΓ,Φ1, $1 $ ∆,Ψq LG^ 1.
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
RGÑ: LG^ 2 Similar to RGÑ: LG^ 1, except using $2 and sub-LG^ 2 in place of $1
and sub-LG^ 1, respectively.
RG Ñ: RG^ Suppose $ : $1 ^ $2 and pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq : pΦ1,Φ2q $ σpΨ1,Ψ2, $q
and "n ppΦ1 $ σ
pΨ1, $1q, pΦ2 $ σ
pΨ2, $2qq, where σ
, σ, σ is a permutation.
Without loss of generality, suppose θ ¨ Φ1. Then Φ1 : σCpΦ
1
1, θq, for some permutatin
σC and
pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq pΦ1 $ σ
pΨ1, $1q
GCut
Γ,Φ11 $ ∆,Ψ1, $1 pΦ2 $ σ
pΨ2, $2q RG^ .
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
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LG ^ 1 Suppose ϕ : ϕ1 ^ ϕ2 and pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆q : pσ1pΓ1, ϕq $ σ1pθ,∆q and "n
pσ2pΓ1, ϕ1q $ ∆q, where σ
1, σ2 are permutations. Follows similarly from the subcaseRGÑ:
LG^ 1.
LG^ 2 Similar to RGÑ: LG^ 1.
RG^ Suppose ϕ : ϕ1^ϕ2 and pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq : pΓ1,Γ2 $ σ1pϕ,∆1,∆2qq and "n ppΓ1 $
σ2pϕ1,∆1qq, pΓ2 $ σ
3pϕ2,∆2qqq, where σ
1, σ2, σ3 are permutations. If ϕ is not θ, then we
have a case similar to sub-RG^ of RÑ.
Suppose ϕ : θ. We shall prove this result via structural induction on pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq. All
subcases except RG^ : LG^ 1 and RG^ : LG^ 2 follow similarly the previous cases or
subcases of RGÑ, so it shall suffice to prove those subcases.
RG^ : LG ^ 1 Suppose $ : $1 ^ $2 and pσ2pΦ, θq $ Ψq : pσ2pΦ1, $q $ Ψq and "n
ppσpΦ1, $1q $ Ψq, where σ
 is a permutation. If $ is not θ, then this case is similar to
RGÑ: LG^ 1. Suppose $ : θ. We find $1 : ϕ1, so
pΓ1 $ σ
2pϕ1,∆1qq ppσ
pΦ1, $1q $ Ψq
GCut
pΓ1,Φ $ ∆1,Ψq LGW 
pΓ,Φ $ ∆1,Ψq RGW   .
pΓ,Φ $ ∆,Ψq
RG^ : LG^ 2 Similar to RG^ : LG^ 1.
5.4 Properties of Intuitionistic Sequent Logic
This section deals with some important properties of LS , including many properties to
do with propositions that are interchangable. Interchangability of θ with ϕ turns out to
be equivalent to proving the formula p $ θ Ø ϕq. The other crucial find is the property
that ^ is a connective that corresponds in a way to commas between propositions on
the left side of $ and _ is a connective that corresponds in a way to commas between
propositions on the right side of $. In other words, from pσ1pΓ, θ, ϕq $ ∆q one can prove
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pσ2pΓ, θ^ϕq $ ∆q and vice versa for permutations σ1, σ2, and a similar principle applies to
_. Moreover, when combining sequents in LS with L_ or R^, this logically equivalently
corresponds to a product arrangement of the sequent broken down by the propositions
connected by _ or ^ in the fashion given in the proposition below.
Proposition 5.4.1.
1. xpΓ $ σ1p∆, θqq, pΓ $ σ2p∆, ϕqqy !" pΓ $ σ3p∆, θ ^ ϕqq;
2. pΓ $ σ1p∆, θ, ϕqq !" pΓ $ σ2p∆, θ _ ϕqq;
3. pσ1pΓ, θ, ϕq $ ∆q !" pσ2pΓ, θ ^ ϕq $ ∆q.
4. xpσ1pΓ, θq $ ∆q, pσ2pΓ, ϕq $ ∆qy !" pσ3pΓ, θ _ ϕq $ ∆q.
Proof. 1. We find
pΓ $ σ1p∆, θqq pΓ $ σ2p∆, ϕqq RG^
pΓ,Γ $ ∆,∆, θ ^ ϕq LGC 
pΓ $ ∆,∆, θ ^ ϕq RX 
pΓ $ σ3pθ ^ ϕ,∆qq
and
pσ3pΓ $ ∆, θ ^ ϕqq
pθ $ θq L^ 1
pθ ^ ϕ $ θq RX 
pΓ $ σ1pθ,∆qq
pσ3pΓ $ ∆, θ ^ ϕqq
pϕ $ ϕq L^ 2
pθ ^ ϕ $ ϕq RX   .
pΓ $ σ2pϕ,∆qq
2. We find
pΓ $ σ1p∆, θ, ϕqq
pθ $ θq R_ 1
pθ $ θ _ ϕq
GCut
pΓ $ ϕ,∆, θ _ ϕq
pϕ $ ϕq R_ 2
pϕ $ θ _ ϕq
GCut
pΓ $ ∆, θ _ ϕ, θ _ ϕq RGC,
pΓ $ σ2pθ _ ϕ,∆qq
and
pΓ $ σ2pθ _ ϕ,∆qq
pθ $ θq pϕ $ ϕq L_
pθ _ ϕ $ θ, ϕq
GCut
pΓ $ ∆, θ, ϕq RX   .
pΓ $ σ1pθ, ϕ,∆qq
3. and 4. we will let follow from similarity to 2. and 1. respectively.
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This next lemma shows the analogue in LS of Ñ E is derivable in the system, which
further establishes the equivalence between showing θ m ϕ and " p $ θ Ø ϕq.
Lemma 5.4.2.
1. The inference map
pΓ $ θ,∆q pΦ $ θ Ñ ϕ,Ψq
Ñ E,
pΓ,Φ $ ϕ,∆,Ψq
is derivable in LS.
2. " p $ θ Ñ ϕq if and only if for all sequents Γ,∆ we have pΓ $ θ,∆ " Γ $ ϕ,∆q.
3. " p $ θ Ø ϕq if and only if θ m ϕ.
Proof. 1.
Φ $ θ Ñ ϕ,Ψ
I
pϕ $ ϕq pΓ $ θ,∆q LÑ
Γ, θ Ñ ϕ $ ϕ,∆
GCut.
pΓ,Φ $ ϕ,∆,Ψq
2. Suppose pΓ $ θ,∆ " Γ $ ϕ,∆q, for all sequents Γ,∆. Then we have " θ $ ϕ and our
conclusion follows from RÑ. Conversely, suppose " p $ θ Ñ ϕq. Let Γ,∆ be sequents.
By Ñ E, which we proved in part 1 is a derivable in LS , we get
I
pθ $ θq p $ θ Ñ ϕq
Ñ E
θ $ ϕ LGW 
Γ, θ $ ϕ RGW   .
Γ, θ $ ϕ,∆
3. Follows directly from part 2.
Next is this lemma, which shows some of the formulas that are interchangeable in LS .
Do note that the proofs for some of these results involve rather sophisticated Getzen
derivations, but are definitely worth it to see some insights to the system, as well as prove
a very central theorem in this chapter.
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Lemma 5.4.3.
1. θ _ pϕ^ λq m pθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq and θ ^ pϕ_ λq m pθ ^ ϕq _ pθ ^ λq
2. θ ^J m θ and θ_ Km θ;
3. θ^ KmK and θ _J m J;
4. pθ ^ ϕq ^ λ m θ ^ pϕ^ λq and pθ _ ϕq _ λ m θ _ pϕ_ λq
Proof. It shall suffice by Lemma 5.4.2 (3) to prove " p $ θ1 Ø θ2q in order to prove
θ1 m θ2, for any propositions θ1, θ2.
1. We find
I
pθ $ θq R_ 1
pθ $ θ _ ϕq
I
pθ $ θq R_ 1
pθ $ θ _ λq R^
pθ, θ $ pθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λqq LC
pθ $ pθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λqq
I
pϕ $ ϕq L^ 1
pϕ^ λ $ ϕq R_ 2
pϕ^ λ $ θ _ ϕq
I
pλ $ λq L^ 2
pϕ^ λ $ λq R_ 2
pϕ^ λ $ θ _ λq R^
pϕ^ λ, ϕ^ λ $ pθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λqq LC
pϕ^ λ $ pθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λqq L_
pθ _ pϕ^ λq $ pθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λqq LÑ,
p $ pθ _ pϕ^ λqq Ñ ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λqqq
and
I
pϕ $ ϕq
I
pθ $ θq
I
pλ $ λq L_
pθ _ λ $ θ, λq RG^
pθ _ λ, ϕ $ θ, λ^ ϕq LG^ 2.
ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq, ϕ $ θ, λ^ ϕq
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It follows by Proposition 5.4.1 (2), we find " ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq, ϕ $ θ _ pλ^ ϕqq. We
find
I
pθ $ θq
I
pϕ $ ϕq L_
pθ _ ϕ $ θ, ϕq L^ 2
ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq $ θ, ϕq R_ 1
ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq $ θ _ pλ^ ϕq, ϕq ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq, ϕ $ θ _ pλ^ ϕqq
GCut
ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq, pθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq $ θ _ pλ^ ϕq, θ _ pλ^ ϕqq LC
ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq $ θ _ pλ^ ϕq, θ _ pλ^ ϕqq RC
ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λq $ θ _ pλ^ ϕqq RÑ
p $ pθ _ pλ^ ϕqq Ñ ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λqqq
Using R^ on xp $ pθ_ pλ^ϕqq Ñ ppθ_ϕq ^ pθ_ λqqq, p $ pθ_ pϕ^ λqq Ñ ppθ_ϕq ^
pθ _ λqqqy, we conclude p $ pθ _ pϕ^ λqq Ø ppθ _ ϕq ^ pθ _ λqqq.
Showing θ ^ pϕ_ λq m pθ ^ ϕq _ pθ ^ λq is (tediously) similar using _ inferences in place
of ^ inferences and vice versa.
2.
I
pθ $ θq L^ 1
pθ ^J $ θq RÑ
p $ pθ ^Jq Ñ θq
I
pθ $ θq
J
p $ Jq R^
θ $ θ ^J RÑ
p $ θ Ñ pθ ^Jqq R^ .
p $ pθ ^Jq Ø θq
We get θ_ Km θ by a similar derivation.
3.
K  
pK$Kq RÑ
pθ^ K$Kq
p $ pθ^ Kq Ñ θq
K  
pK$ θ^ Kq RÑ
p $ θ Ñ pθ^ Kqq R^ .
p $ pθ^ Kq Ø θq
We get θ _J m J by a similar derivation.
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4. We find
I
pθ $ θq
I
pϕ $ ϕq
I
pλ $ λq R^
pϕ, λ $ ϕ^ λq R^ .
pθ, ϕ, λ $ θ ^ pϕ^ λqq
By repeated use of Proposition 5.4.1 (2), (3), we get " ppθ^ϕq ^ λ $ θ^ pϕ^ λqq, so
using RÑ, we get " p $ ppθ ^ ϕq ^ λq Ñ pθ ^ pϕ^ λqq. Furthermore, we find
I
pθ $ θq
I
pϕ $ ϕq R^
pθ, ϕ $ θ ^ ϕq
I
pλ $ λq R^ .
pθ, ϕ, λ $ pθ ^ ϕq ^ λq
It follows that " p $ pθ ^ pϕ ^ λqq Ñ ppθ ^ ϕq ^ λq, hence we get our desired result of
" p $ ppθ ^ ϕq ^ λq Ø pθ ^ pϕ^ λqq, which proves that pθ ^ ϕq ^ λ m θ ^ pϕ^ λq
proving pθ ^ ϕq ^ λ m θ ^ pϕ^ λq involves similar derivations using _ inferences in place
of ^ inferences.
The last statement of the above lemma has some major use in the highlight theorem
in this section to come. It basically shows that ^ and _ works associatively in a chain of
propositions (as one would expect them to). It allows one to talk about propositions like
φ1 ^ . . .^ φn and ϕ1 _ . . ._ ϕm very eloquently without really having to care about the
order at which the parantheses go since they end up all being interchangeable anyway. It
will then be not terrible abuse of notation to talk about φ1 ^ . . .^ φn and ϕ1 _ . . ._ ϕm
like it was one proposition and not really an interchangeability-class of propositions.
So finally is the theorem that will allow one to convert all sequents into one big propo-
sitions, which in the next section will allow one to do powerful things like...embed LS into
LI in order to establish that they are sound and complete with respect to one another.
Theorem 5.4.4. Let φ1, . . . , φn and ϕ1, . . . , ϕm be sequents. pφ1, . . . , φn $ ϕ1, . . . , ϕmq !"
p $ pφ1 ^ . . .^ φnq Ñ pϕ1 _ . . ._ ϕmqq.
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Proof. We find pφ1, . . . , φn $ ϕ1, . . . , ϕmq " pφ1^. . .^φn $ ϕ1_. . ._ϕmq by repeated use
of Proposition 6.4.1 (2) (3), and pφ1, . . . , φn $ ϕ1, . . . , ϕmq " p $ pφ1 ^ . . .^ φnq Ñ
pϕ1 _ . . ._ ϕmqq follows from RÑ.
Note that
I
pφ1 $ φ1q
I
pφ2 $ φ2q R^
pφ1, φ2 $ φ1 ^ φ2q
I
pφ3 $ φ3q R^



pφ1, . . . , φn1 $ φ1 ^ . . .^ φn1q
I
pφn $ φnq R^,
pφ1, . . . , φn $ φ1 ^ . . .^ φnq
and a similar repetition of I and L_ gives us pϕ1 _ . . ._ ϕm $ ϕ1, . . . , ϕmq. We conclude
for Φ : φ1, . . . , φn and Ψ : ϕ1, . . . ϕn that
pΦ $ φ1 ^ . . .^ φnq pϕ1 _ . . ._ ϕm $ Ψq LÑ
pΦ, pφ1 ^ . . .^ φnq Ñ pϕ1 _ . . ._ ϕmq $ Ψ p $ pφ1 ^ . . .^ φnq Ñ pϕ1 _ . . ._ ϕmqq
Cut.
φ1, . . . , φn $ ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
6
Conclusion and Future Work
It was a real honor to be able to inquire in the field of logic and try to make what may
have been a contribution however small. No reader should be entirely satisfied with what
was presented. For although this is the last chapter, this is by no means the end when it
comes to the direction that future research could go. In fact, there was a lot of ideas that
unfortunately did not make it to this paper since they were not polished at this time. The
end chapter will touch on a few of these sorts of ideas, hopefully clearing up some mystery
while also bringing some inspiring questions to the reader.
6.1 Fixing Mistakes and Tightening Rigor
By no means were the proofs, as well as the general writing, very pollished. Some proofs
for some theorems don’t exist and there are a few mistakes in the proofs that unfortunately
the writer had no time to remedy (although hopefully the all the proofs still communicate
the “right idea”). It is in the writer’s best interest to fix this up in the future.
Moreover, commutative diagrams would have been very nice.
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6.2 Exploring More on “Deduction Class Equivalence”
“Deduction class equivalence” was a very late epiphany, and going back to the hastiness
of some proofs, there is a lot that one might be able to tweek about Deduction Class Equiv-
alence. The first thing one might wonder about is whether it is possibly still too strong
of a condition, or even too weak of one. The second thing is working on the framework
used to derive it. There was a lot of good machinery used that emphasized graph/category
theory, but it might have not been very efficient. Finally, this treatment of equivalence in
no way looked at natural transformations between functors and analyzed equivalence up
to natural isomorphism.
6.3 Generalizing for Infinite Formula-Vectors
One interesting limitation of this theory is that the collections of formulas were limited
to finite collections. There is definitely the machinery out there to extend the objects to
infinite formula vectors. However, doing so might complicate the inductive process for a
little while, especially if the logic in question was not compact, although most were.
6.4 Generalizing Consistency and Satisfiability
In case one didn’t notice, not a peep was mentioned involving “consistency” and “satis-
fiability”. It would definitely be a good idea to also extend a general notion of consistency
among inference maps, and also of “satisfiability” where it fits, such as the valuation logic
that was mentioned.
6.5 Exploring Intuitionistic Logic
This is a big one. While the Gentzen Calculus went fairly deep into the theory, intu-
itionistic logic in general has a propositional form whose theory was unmentioned due to
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the chapter being made on it not being quick enough. It is a rather unfortunate scenario
and all apologies to any reader who was looking forward to a lot of intuitionistic logic.
Here are few definitions involving intuitionistic systems that the writer had, for which he
proposed is deduction class equivalent with the standard notion of intuitionistic logic. And
again the language will be presented here for reference
Definition 6.5.1. The Intuitionistic Propositional Language denoted LI is defined
as follows
1. The class Atom. contains an element pi, called a Propositional Variable, for each
i ¥ 1.
2. The connectives in LI include the constant K and the binary connectives Ñ,^.
Furthermore, we shall further define the connectives  ,_,^,Ø,J as shorthand notation
for the following:
1.  φ : φÑK
2. φ_ ϕ :    φÑ ϕ,
3. φØ ϕ : pφÑ ϕq ^ pϕÑ φq,
4. J :  K. 4
Definition 6.5.2. The Logic LI  xLI , tÑ I,Ñ E,^I,^E1,^E2,_E,Kuy is defined as
the intutionistic propositional logic
The Logic LIO called the intuitionistic propositional ordinary logic defined on the
language LO (as it was defined before) and has all inference maps previously mentioned
in LCO, except LEM and RAA. 4
It is a future work goal to show that these two logics are deduction class equivalent.
As for the semantics, an attempt at a valuation logic, i.e. a better suited truth table was
proposed. Essentially the idea is weakening the requirements for the valuation mapping
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 91
so that there are more of them, and moreover the conditions that assign truth are more
complicated.
Definition 6.5.3. Let φ, ϕ be LC-formulas. A mapping v : Prop Ñ t0, 1u is an intuition-
istic valuation, and part of the valuation class V alI , if
1. vpKq  0,
2. vpφÑ φq  1,
3. if vpφÑ ϕq  1, then vpφq  0 or vpϕq  1,
4. if vp φq  0 or vpϕq  1, then vp φÑ ϕq  1,
5. vpφ^ ϕq  mintvpφq, vpϕqu.
The logic LV I on LC generated by the class V alI of of intuitionistic valuation mappings
shall be called the intuitionistic propositional valuation logic. 4
Interestingly, a lot of the proofs in chapter 4 were designed to be extended more gen-
erally to intuitionistic logic. So it is a good sign for future endeavors, particularly with
LV I .
6.6 Exploring Linear Logic
Believe it or not, this project was inspired by something that was not even close to
making it to the paper. And that is linear logic. Some definitions I had shall be provided
here
Definition 6.6.1. We shall define the linear language LL as follows.
1. The class Atom. contains a positive variable pi and negative variable p
K
i for each i P N.
By definition, we have pKKi  pi, for each i P N. We shall call the operation K Linear
Negation. Note that K is not a connective; rather is a convention for how atomic variables
interact in the language.
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2. The connectives in LL include the binary connectives b,`,&,` and the unary con-
nectives ?, !, and the constant proposition symbol J. We shall call the b connective the
Tensor Product, the ` connective the Tensor Sum, the & connective the Direct
Product, the ` connective the Direct Sum, the ? and ! connectives the “why not”
and “of course” exponentials respectively, and the J symbol the Additive Truth.
Additionally, we shall extend linear negation symbol K to denote the following for any
LL-formulas θ, ϕ:
1. θK b ϕK : pθ ` ϕqK,
2. θK ` ϕK : pθ b ϕqK,
3. θK & ϕK : pθ ` ϕqK,
4. θK ` ϕK : pθ & ϕqK,
5. ?θK : p!θqK,
6. !θK : p?θqK. 4
Definition 6.6.2. We shall define a logic LL which uses the sequent metalanguage ML
of LL with the relation symbol $. The rules of inference shall be as follows for any
propositional variables θ, ϕ and any sequents Γ,∆,Φ,Ψ:
1. Negative Interchangeability
θ,Γ $ ∆
K1
Γ $ θK,∆
Γ $ θ,∆
K2
θK,Γ $ ∆
2. Identity
I
$ θK, θ
3. Exchange
$ Γ, θ, ϕ,∆
X
$ Γ, ϕ, θ,∆
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4. Multiplicative Rules
$ θ, ϕ,Γ `
$ θ ` ϕ,Γ
$ θ,Γ $ ϕ,∆
b
$ θ b ϕ,Γ,∆
5. Additive Rules
$ θ,Γ $ ϕ,Γ
&
$ θ & ϕ,Γ
$ θ,Γ
1`
$ θ ` ϕ,Γ
$ ϕ,Γ
2`
$ θ ` ϕ,Γ
J
$ J,Γ
6. Exponential Rules
$ θ, ?Γ
!
$!θ, ?Γ
$ Γ W?
$?θ,Γ
$?θ, ?θ,Γ C?
$?θ,Γ
$ θ,Γ D?
$?θ,Γ
4
And here, the writer stayed true to his style of defining the language in the fewest con-
nectives possible and deriving the others.
Definition 6.6.3. We shall further introduce the symbols (,K,1,0 to denote the fol-
lowing:
1. θ( ϕ : θK ` ϕ,
2. 1 :!J, K: 1K,
3. 0 : JK,
where θ and ϕ are LL formulas. 4
In short, linear logic has a lot going on, that even experts in the field don’t completely
understand. Looking at the inferences in terms of its meta-sequent language the way that
was done with intuitionistic sequents alas did not behave nicely with this metaframework.
However, a valuation class that is complete with this logic is in the works. But since that
would be cutting short everything else in this project that was already cut short, the
exploration of whether that would work was quickly abandoned.
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There was quite a bit of inquiry of linear logic in this project that unfortunately didn’t
make it to this paper. But hopefully, future inquiry will be made
6.7 Exploring More Languages
The penultimate aspect of future work is that this gave quite a few examples of lan-
guages in the text, but alas there was not a lot of languages that were explored in full
depth. In the future, hopefully more languages will be explored.
6.8 Exploring Predicate Logic
Lastly, how exactly this works for predicate logic really is a question that is the basis
for a lot of research. Particularly, how would the so-called “logical axioms” fall into the
mix, as that definitely has its impact on what it means for two logics to be deduction
class equivalent, and for that matter, sound and complete. And how would quantifiers
be incorporated in the languages and logics that do? Moreover, how could valuations be
applied in a way that makes a system of logic that corresponds to possible models of a
language. I went about trying that in on my example of classic predicate semantics. But
that by no means does it complete justice.
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